In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
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Afghanistan Voice:
A publication of
(APDA)
The Voice Demanding:
Democracy, Freedom,
Afghanistan
Editorial:
The testing by India of five atomic devices and within two weeks the testing by Pakistan of five devices plus an additional one plunged the region into a very dangerous and delicate era, one which given the volatility of escalating conflicts has enormous implications. The United States, having failed to persuade the government of Pakistan not to follow the Indian example, will be bound by certain legal requirements pertaining to nuclear
nonproliferation, and will have to apply sanctions against both countries. We predict, however, that whatever action taken will be too little, too late, and perhaps unproductive if the available options are not pondered very deeply.
We have argued previously that the region, specifically Pakistan has been in the throw of religious and sectarian strife and economically unstable. India, too, has been heightening the level of belligerency by escalating Hindu nationalism, riding on emotions that led to the recent detonation. Both countries need to cool off and acquire the necessary technology to give them better deterrence capabilities, something which will give them the responsible image necessary for any nuclear power.
The Hindu pride in India and the euphoria of the so called Islamic bomb in Pakistan need to give way to responsible diplomacy.
One thing that is very disconcerting is the possibility that initially Pakistan's support of the Taliban was not just for opening the transport route to the energy sources of Central Asia. It appears as though the Taliban militia was a front for them to go ahead with preparations for testing their nuclear capability near the southern borders of Afghanistan. Predictably, the Taliban chastised India severely when the Indian detonations were carried out.
As for the United States response to the explosions, it seems that we have been right all along recommending American involvement from the very beginning. Had America given sufficient importance to the problems of the region, including Afghanistan and the Kashmir problem, problems of proliferation and escalating violence and belligerency in the region (not just economic greed and rush for Central Asian black gold), probably things would not have reached this critical stage. With new conditions emerging within the new global village context, one wonders if the usual response of "We can't police everywhere in the world", coming from various circles in America, is very wise.
Sanctions are after the fact and they usually have negative consequences in that they punish the innocent along with the guilty. Besides, sanctions tend to isolate a regime in trouble and lead it to drastic and desperate moves, things that are to be avoided. Given the circumstances, the U.S. would do well to do more in the region by adopting a more comprehensive approach to the real human rights, political, and economic problems, and deal equitably with wounds that have been seen fit to be bandaged, rather than properly cured.
One cultural difference that should be considered seriously affecting the way problems are approached is that in America or in the West in general, legal documents, contracts, and agreements are sanctified and this may lead to the Western view that a nonproliferation treaty, or no first strike treaty, or some such thing may suffice. In the troubled region under discussion, however, people generally place a great deal of emphasis on just resolutions of conflicts.
The West went through a long period of cold war with hair raising moments. The experience of war and its utter destruction made the West adapt to pragmatic solutions and compromises, leaving many wounds unhealed. That kind of restraint may not have much of a chance in the region under discussion given the rising national, ethnic and religious chauvinism that we have been witnessing recently. Ushering in a new era of tolerance and processes of discussion and compromise in the region will require many years of patient hard work on education, building of democratic institutions, removal of graft and corruption, and fostering economic stability.
We have seen that immediately after the Pakistani tests, Parliamentarian delegations from Pakistan went to various countries, including the U.S., to diffuse the situation. When you would look at the public relations image of this delegation, you would wonder if these people came from the same country that has suspended the constitutional and other legal rights of its citizens in the afterrnath of the detonations, the same country that has recognized a brutal and fanatic "Islamic" regime of the Taliban that it concocted for Afghanistan, possibly for more than economic reasons.
The world community and at the head of it the United States have an obligation to help save humanity from the chaotic atmosphere that has been engulfing the Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern regions for too long, now all the more dangerous because of the introduction of weapons of mass destruction. The world has to look for serious remedies instead of bandages. Immediate work toward securing non-proliferation, non-aggression agreements and the like are needed, but the serious work of diffusing long standing conflicts and injection of sanity to the otherwise lawless, free for all mentality that has plagued the region will be a real challenge to be addressed as we enter the new millenium.
Both Hindu and Islamic traditions have full capability of nurturing responsible citizenship in the advanced scientific age since both have a rich tradition of ethnic and religious tolerance. The present circumstance is a difficult phase that both are going through. Let us hope that the enormous responsibility of embarking on a nuclear course will give the leaders of these countries and others in the region the foresight to recognize the importance of restraint and to show keenness to seek command and control technology. Public relations and damage control are not enough. These leaders have to show real responsibility in statesmanship.
The region is in deep trouble. People's wishes for democratic rule have been suffocated
by show of force and chauvinistic ethnic or religious claims backed by weapons.
Pakistan, just as it supports plebiscite in Kashmir, has to also respect the wishes of the Afghan people and refrain from wheeling and dealing to safeguard its influence in Afghanistan by trained terrorists, puppets that do Pakistan's bidding, but put the whole region at risk.
More importantly, we hope the world community, specifically the nuclear club, will find creative ways to alleviate the problems of the region by being firm and forthright in demanding real solutions to long standing problems in the way of peace and prosperity. With proper resolve, we believe the defeatist mentality that has contributed to drastic actions by irresponsible elements adding to cynicism about the possibility of redemption can be eradicated.
The region needs participatory democracy, responsible leadership, peace, and economic prosperity. If the past two decades (when Pakistan was used as a conduit to help the Afghans in the Soviet war) are any indication, we must realize that the possibility of Pakistan seeking a windfall and abusing the situation is real. This time around America has to use a better policy. Otherwise, we are doomed to repeat the failures of the past. What needs to be done: get out of covert wheeling and dealing, reward responsible behavior, and give peace a real chance.
Prof. Nazif Shahrani Legacies of Hukumat-i Mutamarkiz-i Qawi:
This brings me to the other significant questions raised earlier in this essay: During the past century in Afghanistan, what have been the legacies of a strong centralized, punitive and primarily extractive modern state which has always "mortgaged" some of its authority to potential foreign enemies of the nation in order to secure financial and military assistance? How could a critical examination and appreciation of these legacies help us shed some light on a better understanding of the political and military chaos reigning in the country today?
In my view, more than a century of state centralization policies and practices in Afghanistan have brought about several significant legacies which have had a considerable impact on the current tragic situation in the country:
First, from the perspective of both rulers and their subjects (ra'yat), an official government appointment at any level was seen as a means of extracting and accumulating wealth from the people and not one of dispensing the needed services for their "citizens" (ru'aya)28(1). Indeed, state officials in all government institutions, including even village school teachers, who were always appointed from the various ministries in the capital, Kabul, and almost always in posts away from their own native territory, were viewed, with few exceptions, by most citizens as outside agents of abuse, corruption and oppression. Therefore, the creation and perpetuation of feelings of mistrust towards government, and distrust of politics in general, amongst the great majority of non-Muhammadzai, especially non-Pushtun aqwam throughout the country, has been a crucial legacy of this century-long experience of state centralization29(2). By pursuing an ill-defined Afghan (Pushtun) nationalist policy, the state officials often, in practice if not in public rhetoric, denied the existence of "other", non-Pushtun ethnolinguistic communities30(3). Also, in the name of creating national unity, the state under its various long- and short-lived regimes, systematically undermined the identity and local autonomy of distinct ethnic and sectarian communities31(4) living in Afghanistan. In response, the local communities saw the state as the main source of their oppression and they devised complex social mechanisms to insulate themselves from direct contact with government agents and agencies. Indeed, ethnographic evidence clearly shows that local communities isolated themselves from corrupt government officials by creating community based parallel power structures (i.e. a strong shari'a governed civil society) to resolve internal problems locally through their own trusted leaders, both religious and secular. It was, indeed, these trusted local figures who emerged during the anti-Soviet jihad as the leaders and commanders of the many local resistance units all across the country32(5).
Second, another significant consequence of the discriminatory state policies towards the so called "minorities" was politicization of ethnicity and tribalism. The state officials systematically used ethnic and tribal affiliations as a basis for distribution of scarce state resources-- economic, educational, and political. Indeed, I would suggest that in Afghanistan, the idea and institutions of the modern state were thoroughly "tribalized" under the formative influences of the dominant constitutive principles of Afghan political culture-- the khanawada and qawm-u-kheysh. This development is ironic in view of the fact that, the Afghan state authorities in all regimes (monarchic, republican, Communist, Islamist, and Taliban), have repeatedly declared their intentions, at least publicly, to pacify, disarm and "de-tribalize" the Afghan society. What is paradoxical, of course, is that the various regimes, at least until the beginnings of jihad struggles against the Soviet invaders and their Afghan Communist proteges, had remarkable achievements in pacifying and de-tribalizing a large segment of the civil society by means of the "tribalization" of the institutions of centralized state itself. Furthermore, the staffing and operation of this "tribalized" Afghan state relied heavily on another dominant form of political culture in Afghanistan-- the ties of patronage and clientelism based on the distribution and redistribution of state resources33(6).
Third, throughout this century, the processes of centralizing the state in Afghanistan, and the creation of a strong national government in Kabul34(7), have been justified-- and is currently being justified again by the Mujahideen government and the rival Taliban militia in terms of a national defense strategy against potential foreign threats, especially from neighboring countries. Paradoxically, however, the realization of this dream by the previous central governments, at least for some brief periods, have been always the by-product of the state's increasing and voluntary dependency (economic, technological and military) upon the potential foreign enemy. For example, the monarchic regimes from Amir Abdur Rahman to Zahir Shah (1880-1973), Daoud's short-lived republic (1973-1978), and the Communist regimes (1978-1992) were dependent upon British India and the former USSR. And, the Mujahideen resistance parties and Afghan refugee communities (1978-1992) were utterly dependent for their sheer survival upon external sources of support such as the United Nations agencies, numerous Non-Governmental organization (NGOs), and over friendly nations with their own Afghan clients and agendas to promote in the region--e.g., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Iran. After the collapse of the former USSR and its puppet regime in Kabul, the Mujahideen governments and their many opponents in the bloody struggle for power, have all followed the same patterns of dependency and foreign patronage to continue their patrons' proxy wars. The post-Soviet list of patrons include some new players from the newly independent states of Central Asia, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, as well as Russia, and more recently an increasing number of multi-national corporations35(8). Not surprisingly, the central governments of Afghnaistan (and unfortunately, various mujahideen factions as well, especially the most recent Pakistani-created Taliban militia) have used their borrowed strength more consistently to crash their domestic enemies (both real and perceived) and disenfranchise them from political participation, than to direct it against any foreign interventionists. In fact, historically no central government in Afghanistan, no matter how strong, has ever been able to withstand foreign invasions. On the contrary, the central governments have often "invited" foreign enemies into the country to protect their regime against the wrath of their own people. Indeed, the recent experiences of the successful jihad against the Soviets and the Communist Afghan government, makes the fact amply clear that a dependent centralized government, no matter how powerful, cannot defend Afghanistan's national territorial integrity and/or independence. Instead, the task of liberating the country has consistently fallen on the shoulders of local communities across the nation. Unfortunately, the legacy of the oppressive domestic policies before the Communist coup of 1978, aimed at disarming and weakening local autonomous communities, had seriously hampered the possibilities for a far more successful community based, anti-colonial jihad struggle. That is, more vibrant, better-armed, well disciplined, self- reliant, and vigorous local communities (or a stronger "civil society") would have been better able to withstand the Soviet Communist threat. Fortunately, for the Muslim peoples of Afghanistan, the century-long state policies aimed at the destruction of local autonomous communities were not entirely effective. Emasculated, disarmed and weakened considerably, most of these communities, especially in the rural areas, were able to quickly reconstitute themselves in the face of a deteriorating central government power. Indeed, they were able to mobilize quickly and to fight effectively in the anti-Soviet Communist jihad struggle. And they not only successfully defended their own local communities, but the local resistance groups also collectively regained Afghanistan's national independence. As a result of the decade and a half of local community based successful resistance struggles, civil society, especially in non-Pushtun territories of northern, central and western Afghanistan has been re-established, and is today much stronger then ever before. Their recent fierce resistance against the encroaching Taliban militia to the areas north of Kabul (Shamali region), and in northern and central Afghanistan, indicates that they are not willing to return to the status quo.
Fourth, and politically a particularly crippling consequence of the century-long corrupt and autocratic dynastic rule by the Muhammadzai clan of the Pushtun, has been the creation of a persistent attitude that the members of the defunct royal family and their Muhammadzai clan in particular, and the Pushtun tribes in general, are the only legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. Indeed, they have convinced not only themselves but many Western experts and even the agents of foreign governments, both near and far from our frontiers, that there cannot be an Afghanistan without Pushtun (Pathan) leadership. Sadly enough, there are some among the non-Pushtun technocrats, and even in the ranks of the former mujahideen leadership, who have also internalized this moronic "fact".
Finally, and perhaps the most remarkable legacy of the policies of the old form of "tribalized" state system in contemporary political culture of Afghanistan may be its effect upon the rise and formation of many forms of political communities opposing the corrupt and oppressive state system itself. These opposition movements and formations have included ideologically based secular "nationalist", Islamist, and various shades of leftist and Communist political parties, associations, and organizations. The numbers and variety of such ideologically diverse, organized groups in Afghanistan, at least since the mid-1960s, needs no elaboration. But, again as Chatterjee has pointed out, the roots of "our postcolonial misery...[are] not in our ability to think out new forms of the modern community but in our surrender to the old forms of the modern state."36(9) Indeed, without exception, all opposition groups and groups with alternative ideologies (communities) have, consciously or not, tended to blindly imitate (or surrender to) the organizational structure (and methods of staffing and operations), commonly used by the "old forms of the modern [tribalized Afghan] state37(10)." (Cont. in future)
1. (1)Interestingly, the term ra'yat (plural ru'aya) Persian/Arabic word widely used in the various vernaculars of Afghanistan, and often translated as "citizen", in fact means "subject" or "an inferior". That is, one who must submit to the ruler as a subject with considerable responsibilities, but little or no rights.
2. (2)See also M. Nazif Shahrani, "Afghanistan's Muhajirin (Muslim "Refugee Warriors"): Politics of Mistrust and Distrust of Politics", in E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen (eds.), Mistrusting Refugees (Berkeley & Los Angeles: Uiniversity of California Press, 1995), pp. 187-206.
3. The invisibility of non-Pushtun groups (even the larger Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch and Nuristani) was particularly evident in official histories taught in the school systems. These official histories, written from the perspective of the "real" Afghans
(3)(Pushtun), as the representatives of the true Aryan race,depicted Afghanistan essentially as a Pushtun creation that was to serve exclusively their interests as the "master marshal race" (for an interesting recent rendition of such views see Hassan Kakar’s “Dar Bora-i Nawishtaha-i Shoghuli Ghuryani wa Degaran” Afghan Millat, No.54 & 55, May 13, 1997). Members of the non-Pushtun groups (including the Tajiks who are also Aryans) were either denied any positive role in the national historical narratives or their role was rendered in a negative light-- e.g., Amir Habibullah II (the only Tajik ruler in this century) is described as a thief and dubbed as Bacha-i Saqaw, (‘the Water Carrier's Son’). For the only sympathetic account of the details on the life of the Tajik ruler from Shamali, see Khalillulah Khalili, 'Ayyar-i az Khurasan: Amir Habibullah, Khadem-i Din-i Rasul Allah, Peshawar: Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan, (1980).
4. (4)Some of the most obvious attempts at undermining larger regional identities consisted of redrawing and renaming administrative units (sub-districts, districts and provinces) in the name of "administrative reforms"-- similar to Russian (Soviet) colonial policies across the Amu Darya in Western Turkistan (former Soviet Central Asia) which effectively wiped out the appellation Turkistan from popular memory in the area. In Afghanistan's administrative reforms, not only did the name Turkistan or Afghan Turkistan fall into disuse in reference to northern Afghanistan, but the term Qataghan, a name for a major Uzbek tribal community occupying the central parts of Afghan Turkistan, as well as, the name of the territory the Qataghan tribe inhabited (the region Qataghan wa Badakhshan) were also completely altered by dividing and renaming the region into several smaller provinces. Similarly, Hazarajat, the land of the Hazara shi'a community was divided and renamed to undermine their ethnic memory and social existence. The entire scheme of creating and using administrative units as a basis for "electing" representatives for the rubber stamp parliaments (Majlis-i Shura wa Sano/ Wulusi Jergah and Meshranu Jergah) and for the equally meaningless so-called Loya Jirga (Grand National Assembly), was another clever ploy used by the centralizing state to assure Pashtun dominance of the political process in the nation. That is, a much larger number of provinces and districts (wuluswali/ hukumati) were created in Pushtun areas with fewer inhabitants, compared to a smaller number of such administrative units for significantly larger territories and population in non-Pushtun regions. An important legacy of this deed is being played out now daily in the media claims that the Taliban militia are in control of 22 (predominantly Pushtun) provinces, hence they are ruling two third of Afghanistan. This is an absurdity if one closely examines the existing demographic and territorial statistics for the provinces of Afghanistan, even those provided by the former regimes in Kabul. For comparative examination of facts and figures on provinces of Afghanistan see Mohammad Siddiq Sarwari, “Marifi Welayat-i Keshwar”, De Afghanistan Kalanay (Kabul: Dawlati Matba’a, 1974)pp, 710-762. Another major source of information from the government itself is Atalas-i Qaryaha-i Afghanistan, 3 vols., (Atlas of the Villages of Afghanistan), also published by the Central Statistics Office, Kabul, during Daoud's republic. Some believe that the main reason why the governments in Afghanistan never attempted a full census of the country's population may have been due to their well founded fear of discovering that their claims of Pushtun majority in the country would be proved wrong. Therefore, in order to ameliorate the abuses of past and present, there is a strong need for taking a complete demographic census of the country. There is also a need to re-assess the fundamental criteria to be used in redrawing the boundaries of provincial, district and sub-district administrative units and thus to determine population representations in national assemblies in the future state structure of Afghanistan.
5. (5)See Shahrani "The Kirghiz Khans: Style and Substance of Traditional Local Leadership in Central Asia ,1986).
(6).33. A rising concern about the Taliban practices in this
regard, even among Pushtun groups, is the make-up of
their, so called, Central Shura or Council, and the
higher echelons of their administration, which are
staffed almost exclusively by Kandahari village
mullahs (for a list and brief biographical information
on their leadership cadre, see, Rameen Moshref, The
Taliban (New York: Occasional Papers no. 35, The
Afghanistan Forum 1077:6-7).
6. (7)The exceptions are the brief interruption in 1929 and, more recently since the beginning of jihad against the Soviets and their client Communist regimes (1979-1992).
7. (8)The increasing dependency of the Afghan state, especially since the mid-1950's upon international assistance, and its consequent impact upon the country's domestic economic and political policies, and the political economy of state and society has been discussed elsewhere at some length: see, Shahrani “State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective; M. Nazif Shahrani, “Afghanistan: State and Society in Retrospect” in Ewan Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (eds.), The Cultural Basis of Afghan
Nationalism (London: and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990, pp 41-49). The dependency of mujahideen organization upon the outside sources of assistance (governmental, NGO, private, Muslim and non-Muslim, neighbors and afar) has similar crippling policy implications for the future of the country, which must be addressed with honesty.
8. (9)Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, p.11.
9. (10)It is important to note that all Pushtun dominated mujahideen political organizations, without exception, and the Taliban militia in particular are fighting to conquer the whole country and re-establish Pushtun hegemony through a strong centralized state structure based on Amir Abdur Rahman's model. The backers of Muhammad Zahir Shah, the self-proclaimed technocratic elite living in the west, also share the same dreams. The only major Tajik political organization in the country, Rabbani-Massoud group, also calls for the establishment of a strong centralized government. So far, the call for a "federal" state structure that would allow for local and regional autonomy has been hinted only by the Hazara shi'a and the Uzbek groups in the country. Unfortunately, any suggestion of local self-governance, is immediately viewed (falsely) by the proponents of hukumati mutamarkiz-i qawi (strong centralized government, preferably in the hands of their own family, tribe or ethnic group) as an evidence of a desire to divide the country or a scheme which would threaten the alleged territorial integrity of Afghanistan.
Mr. James Kellogg's article on the issue of Controlling Power and the Principle of Diffusing Power is presented in condensed form:
***
Previously, I have stated that an Islamic community can only exist when the people are given freedom. Given the polarized conditions as they exist today in Afghanistan, a real peace will be difficult to achieve. Acknowledgement of the difficulty that an Afghan peace with freedom entails should not preclude our attempt to pursue this goal. The challenge to every Afghan citizen is to find a method of human interaction so that the good in a community of men triumphs over the bad. Let us begin to describe a practical process of constructing an Afghan peace consistent with Islam.
Consider the current situation where two broad camps exist in Afghanistan in basic opposition to each other's rule. What compels either side to wage war with each other at the obvious expense to the average citizen? The answer is that each side possesses sufficient power to act independently of each other and the people. The leadership of each camp argues the righteousness of their goal to assume national leadership, which justifies their means to achieve their goal. If you agree that an Islamic community requires consultation with the people comprising the community, then neither camp's actions are justified given the absence of the people's consent (Emphasis added). Both camps' likely response to this criticism is the argument that they do have the people's consent for their actions. However, neither side can provide substantive proof that they have consulted with the people under their control and tabulated the people's response. The power each camp presently enjoys is an ever-present threat to the Afghan people's freedom and well being.
Power manifests itself in many forms, from political, military, economic, cultural and religious activities. I would remind every citizen that the people's control of power in all of its forms is an important objective. The death and destruction inflicted on the nation during Jihad is a direct result of the communists' assumption of absolute power over the national and provincial governments. At the village level and below the people retained the freedom of action to conduct the Jihad. This freedom greatly contributed to the ultimate success of the Afghan Jihad. In the quest for an Afghan peace consistent with Islam, we must understand the methods of controlling power.
(At this point Mr. Kellogg illustrates methods of controlling power with examples and shows the importance of building autonomous institutions with checks and balances through what he calls the principle of diffusing power. These institutions are shown to be the three branches of government with independence from each other in a democratic society. Mr. Kellogg continues offering his vision of a system of government responsive to the people's demands through village jirgas leading to Grand Jirga or traditional Afghan Assembly. Then, Mr. Kellogg envisions the drafting of a Constitution, its eventual ratification by the people, and democratic institutions consistent with Islam. Mr. Kellogg rightly observes the compatibility of this system with Islamic injunctions in the Qur'an.)
He continues thus:.
Assuming that the Afghan's national and provincial governments can be structured as described, we still need a process of deciding who should lead these governments. Recall for a moment how the Afghan people found the unity of purpose to conduct the Afghan Jihad. Each citizen exercised his free will to decide his own response to the Soviet communist invasion. Each citizen's decision applied collectively led to a national decision to fight Jihad. If you agree that Islam requires that the appropriate way for free men to achieve consensus for community action is through consultation with each other, then it is logical that the people's consultation is required to choose the government leadership. The periodic consultation of a community to decide who should lead the government is a democratic process which is consistent with Islam (Emphasis added). An Afghan peace with freedom requires a democratic election of the leadership of any future Afghan government. The chain of authority should extend from the people to the village Jirga through the provincial government leadership and ultimately to the selection of national leadership.
Each of Afghanistan's thirty-one provinces requires a governmental structure embracing the principle of diffusion of power. Care should be given to the responsibilities and duties between the national and provincial governments. The historical pattern of national government interference with the provincial government policies is a source of resentment by the local communities of Afghanistan. A citizen naturally seeks remedies to his problems from a provincial government that is capable of acting on the problem. By democratically electing these provincial leaders, they will likely be more responsive to the community's needs. Each provincial government can develop policies which are uniquely tailored to a province's needs. If the provinces are given the power and authority to independently respond, then each province can develop policies which allow the people to develop at their own pace.
I have made an argument for developing a social contract between all of the people comprising Afghanistan and any future government. This social contract requires the development of a document describing in detail the responsibilities and duties of the national and provincial governments. Care should be given to observe the principle of diffusion of power in each government structure. The leadership of all governments will be democratically selected to legitimatize their rule. The basic human rights should be guaranteed to every Afghan citizen. The document will represent a rule of law ...This social contract should reflect the Afghan's unique cultural heritage and should be consistent with the principles of Islam.
The Grand Jirga is the traditional Afghan Assembly which is suitable to the task of developing this social contract. The Grand Jirga should consist of two separate assemblies both of which must agree to the document's final form. The first assembly would be selected based upon population (i.e. one representative for every 300,000 citizens). This should provide for an assembly of about 500 members. This is a manageable assembly size to complete the task and still large enough to provide adequate national representation. The second assembly should consist of say four representatives from each of Afghanistan's thirty-one provinces regardless of population. This arrangement will protect the less densely populated provinces from being overwhelmed by larger populated provinces. A proscribed majority (60% or two-thirds) of both assemblies would be required before the document can be presented. The people should freely discuss the merits of this social contract between the Afghan people and its future government structure. After a suitable period of consultation a plebiscite should be conducted to accept or reject to be governed by this document. If there is acceptance by a majority (50% plus1), then a government can be formed. If the document is rejected, then the Grand Jirga would be reassembled to modify this social contract. This process would be repeated until there is consent by the Afghan people to be governed by this document.
The Afghan Jihad remains to be completed since all of the Afghan people comprising the nation have not agreed upon a peace. If the Afghan people have a shared goal of an Afghan Peace with freedom, then I have described a process which will allow the Afghan people to achieve this goal. However, the two camps fighting for control of Afghanistan will likely reject this process. If these two camps do in fact take an opposition position, then I will make an appeal to the wisdom of individual citizen of Afghanistan.
Every citizen still retains the free will to decide his own destiny as proscribed in Islam. As citizens of Afghanistan, if you agree with this process for an Afghan peace, then join with your neighbors and demand that a Grand Jirga be formed. Such demands will contain a risk of reprisals from the existing governing authorities. However, a continuation of the status quo will subject the people to a risk of never achieving an acceptable Afghan peace. Remember the Russian communists failed to impose their will on the Afghan people once the nation decided to fight Jihad. If the Afghan people can achieve a national consensus to pursue this peace process, then neither camp can resist the collective will of the nation. The ultimate right of any government to govern rests with the consent of the people (Emphasis added). The future direction of the Afghan Jihad is in your hands. Unlike others,I believe the collective wisdom of the Afghan people will ultimately decide the question of an Afghan peace with freedom consistent with Islam.
(In the hope of seeing the day in Afghanistan when the ballot is triumphant over the bullet. The Editor)