In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Afghanistan Voice

Afghanistan Voice:

A publication of

The Association for

Peace and Democracy

forAfghanistan

(APDA)

The Voice Demanding:

Democracy, Freedom,

and Dignity for All,

Seeking to Enhance the Cause of

A Free, United

Afghanistan

Editorial:

TERRORIST ATTACKS ON

U. S. EMBASSIES, BEN LADIN CONNECTION, AND THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT

Just before the Taliban take over of Mazar-i Sharif and Badakhshan and the defeat of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, far away in the African countries of Kenya and Tanzania, deadly suicide attacks at the U.S. embassies killed more than two hundred people and injured thousands. Were they related? Osama's "finger prints are all over it" according to U. S. intelligence reports.

Afghanistan Voice published a detailed research finding in its December, 1997, issue showing the Taliban ties with international terrorist organizations and in particular mentioned Osama ben Ladin, the Saudi multi-millionaire who lives under the protection of the Taliban, as the strogest influence radicalizing the Taliban.

The irony is that this connection was known, but the U.S. continued to be persuaded by other concerns which made it almost certainly biased in favor of the Taliban. Despite the US officials pointing out the reign of terror brought on women in Afghanistan by the Taliban extremists, and despite all evidence pointing to Pakistani madrasas and the ISI giving full support to Taliban extremism, still the U.S. claimed impartiality in Afghan affairs giving lip service to a broad-based government. The U. S. criticized the misdeeds of the Taliban, while at the same time gave the appearance of siding with them, possibly hoping that the militia would unite Afghanistan, bring peace in the beleaguered country, and guarantee the pipeline construction for the oil company, Unocal. This situation created much confusion, to say the least.

As this paper was going to print, we found out that the Palestanian Muhammed Sadiq Oda (Howaida), actually Muhammed Sadiq al-Muayidda, caught in Pakistan and delivered to investigating authorities, confessed to his ties with Osama, resulting in the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's demand that the Taliban deliver Osama to U. S. authorities. We also heard of the Taliban playing the game of denial and asking for proof.. Several times in the past, the Taliban had given assurances to the world that Ben Ladin had no terrorist aims. Then, the Taliban foreign minister said he did not believe Osama was involved, but even if he was, they would not hand Osama over. If he was guilty, the Taliban would punish him themselves as it was not right to deliver a Muslim to infidels. Notice the un-Islamic views of the Taliban minister. In Islam, Jews and Christians are recognized as "people of the book".

As we were watching the strange development of Pakistani government cooperating with the U. S. and the Taliban taking the hard line, we suddenly heard on August 20^th that the Clinton Administration struck against terrorist bases in Afghanistan (Khost and Jalalabad) and a pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan, using cruise missiles.

The Pakistani motive is clear. Faced with serious financial problems and increasing pressure on the government from religious institutions, the secular regime in Pakistan has been seriously challenged. The cooperation with the U. S., imposed after Pakistani nuclear detonation, can possibly ease the sanctions from the U. S. Meanwhile continuing to do their best to gain political recognition for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This recognition would firmly establish a regime that would insure Pakistan's hegemony over the regional trade and thus provide a solution to her economic woes.

The Taliban who get enormous amounts of money from the terrorist organizations and drugs smuggling operations to finance their war, cannot afford to lose these sources. The language of intolerance that they have become used to, especially now in the wake of their conquests, has to be matched with deeds in favor of their sponsors.

Some say that the Taliban position will harden after the U. S. strike, whereas others feel they might come to their senses and the moderate factions among them will win over.

Suppose, they take the shrewd path of cooperating with the U. S. to not jeopardize their chances of political recognition. The question is, what will the U. S. do? There are some hints in the words of the U. S. officials that are worth noting.

The insistence, for instance, that this is not state-sponsored terrorism could be a way of clearing the Taliban? The dearest thing for the Taliban is the international recognition of their regime and for that, they might be willing to make a shrewd decision to bargain their way to recognition. The fact that the U.S. doesn't call it state-sponsored terrorism, may be a way to keep the door to negotiations with the Taliban open. Otherwise, such negotiations would be with terrorists, something at odds with established U. S. practices.

A scenario of Taliban cooperating in this area and the U. S. closing its eyes to all the other atrocities of the Taliban would make a mockery of U. S. stand for human rights and democracy. In effect, it would tell the world that as long as you do business with the U. S., you have license to commit any in-home human rights violation. It would be interesting to know what the U.S. was prepared to do before the strike, had the Taliban complied with the U. S. demand.

There are parallels to this situation in other areas such as the U.N. aid workers and the International Committee of the Red Cross having had to succumb to the Taliban hard line demands. A consideration of being able to do humanitarian work has forced these organizations to close their eyes to the Taliban ridiculous and dangerous practices.

Is there the possibility that the human rights violations by the Taliban, still protested by Amnesty International and others, be forgiven if the Taliban cooperate? Is it going to be the fate of the Afghans, especially Afghan women, to remain under the rule of terror indefinitely if the Taliban terrorist face should make one shrewd "sacrifice" to gain a license for terror? After all, the Taliban have openly said that all they want is to make Afghanistan a "model" society (a society where flogging, amputations, slashing of throats, even indiscriminate ethnic massacres would be a spectator sport).

The Taliban persistence to defy the international community, to disregard the United Nations complaints, and to harass or block the international press seems to have given them a bargaining chip. Under terrorist sponsorship, the militia has gained enormous wealth that is expended to buy territory and loyalties. They seem to be intent on going to any length to get their license for in home terror. It is up to the world to not be intimidated so much that it should compromise the defense of human rights. And it is up to the U. S. Congress to take the administration to task on these delicate issues.

In the concentration camp that the Taliban have made of Afghanistan, minority ethnic populations

and women are subject to ridiculous rules and severe atrocities under the name of "purist Islam". Rumors of mass killings in captured territories circulate, and free outside press is denied access to ascertain the truth of these rumors. And these conditions will probably go on for years with very few effective voices to condemn the inhumane and unIslamic practices because, for now, the Taliban still have the terror card in their hand.

Association of Peace and Democracy for Afghanistan (APDA) expresses its deep sympathy for the families of the innocent victims of terror. We have always criticized the U. S. soft policy on the extremist Afghan Taleban movement, which is considered by many countries in the region to be a creation of Pakistan, Washington, and Saudi Arabia.

The Afghan Taleban have not only turned Afghanistan into a terrorists' haven, they have also imposed a reign of terror on the brutalized and impoverished Afghan people. The extremist Taleban movement is universally charged with gender apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and indiscriminate bombings of cities and villages in northern Afghanistan.

We have always stated and stressed in our publications that Taleban have links with Pakistani and Arab extremist or terrorist groups and organizations --including the Pakistani Harakat al-Ansar, Sepah Suhaba, Jamiyat ul-Ulema, the Bangledeshi Al-Jihad, the Egyptian Islamic Group, and the Egyptian Al-Jihad group, which make up the so-called "The World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders," led by Osama ben Ladin.

Today the Afghan Taleban have not only given sanctuary to several thousand Arab terrorists in Afghanistan, they have also established a regional Pakistani-Bangladeshi-Afghan Taleban front to capture the whole of Afghanistan and establish an Islamic caliphate, which --as they have shown in the occupied cities--would be the most repressive regime in the history of mankind.

It is unfortunate that the State Department is still courting the Taleban and even speaking of granting them recognition in exchange for the extradition of Ben Ladin.

We believe the extradition of Ben Ladin in exchange for the recognition of Taleban is in fact a recognition and legitimization of Islamic extremism, gender apartheid, genocide. And repression, which have characterized the movement. A recognition of the Taleban by the United States will be a tragedy for the Afghan people, for democracy, for human rights, and for the rights of the sixty percent of the Afghan population: the women. The real solution to fighting terrorism and drug trafficking in and from Afghanistan can only be found in preventing foreign interference, ending the civil war, and establishing a broad-based democratic government. Toward achieving this end, the United States has done very little by showing no sincerity and seriousness in ending the Afghan tragedy, which is rooted in the cold war.

From Military Victory to Political Misery: Contingencies(Continued from previous issues)

Prof. Nazif Shahrani

Why and how did the long established, ideologically organized, Islamist parties and organizations begin to lose their political relevance or significance, and give way to intense inter-communal proxy wars financed and managed by foreign powers? What about the legacies of the collapse of the centralized state and the gains and achievements of the jihad years (1979-1992) for imagining the future of the state in post-jihad Afghanistan?

To begin with, I would like to suggest that, local community based Islamist political and military organizations worked admirably well in the context of ideological opposition to colonial occupation forces and a domestic Communist regime. The key to the mujahideen parties' military successes were primarily due to a new modernist Islamist ideology that could mobilize diverse local communities, and minimally reorganize and operate within the political framework of the existing traditional local community structures of solidarity and loyalties. Communities (local, provincial, regional, ethnic and/or sectarian) were willing and eager participants in the jihad for two, not entirely related, reasons: 1) ideological opposition to Communism and the defense of Islam and the Muslim motherland against what they regarded as Afghan Communists traitors and their invading Soviet patrons, and 2) for the long-subjugated and abused non-Pushtun communities, opposition to oppressive, colonial and exploitative practices of the modern institution of a Pushtun dominated centralized state, presented another motivating force. During the years of jihad, the mujahideen consistently expressed and articulated local communities' ideological opposition to Communism and Soviet colonialism. However, at the same time the mujahideen leadership, much to their own detriment as well as the national interest, neglected to address their local community partners' well founded historic fears of the abusive powers of the centralized state.

To the contrary, upon taking power from the Communist regime in 1992, the mujahideen governments embraced the old forms of the modern state and began to fight others for exclusive control of state powers. In this effort, every contending group in the ongoing bloodshed has tried to secure domestic and foreign allies, even from the ranks of their former Communist enemies. Most of them have done so quite successfully. The Taliban, the latest contenders for state power, are following suit not only in recruiting numerous former Communist Pushtun military officers and civilian officials, but also in embracing the familiar old forms of the modern state with more determination than ever before. It is this unconditional surrender by the Afghan mujahideen and their militant opponents, the Taliban militia, to the "old forms of modern state" and governance structures, combined with their blatant disregard of local, provincial, regional, ethnic and sectarian community governance interests and structures, that I believe to be, among other things, an important factor for the perpetuation of the current intense inter-communal strife in the country. This tragic situation is further complicated by the utter dependency of all combatants, for national supremacy of their own party-qawm, upon external patrons (often potential foreign sources of threat to national security) for material and political support. It is also clear that, in this environment of multiple power centers inside the country, each group is connected to multiple, often competing, sources of international assistance--the many tribes of international donors. These friendly donor countries, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations do not necessarily all share the same interests, certainly they do not share the national interests of the peoples of Afghanistan. Indeed, many of them would consider the return of peace to the war- torn Afghanistan detrimental to their own national and regional geostrategic interests, and indeed it might be so. Furthermore, as long the feuding Afghan parties continue to adhere to, and surrender to, the old forms of the modern state structure, the flames of war will be fueled by outside forces that benefit from instability in the region. Therefore, one of the major contingencies for even beginning to address the current military and political impasse in Afghanistan seem to be a radical change in the political economy of the warring factions and the sources of their effective support. However, much to my own personal dismay, based on the observed behavior of our neighbors and some distant "friends," especially the increasingly belligerent attitude of the governments of Pakistan towards the non-Pushtun communities in Afghanistan, any appreciable change in the political ecology of the current proxy wars in beleaguered Afghanistan seem remote, to say the least.

The Possibility of a New Relation Between Civil Society and the Future State

On the bases of our brief examination of Afghanistan's political culture; the legacies of the century-long experiences of the relatively strong centralized, but economically and militarily dependent state structure and political economy; the legacies and achievements of the jihad era; and the current political ecology of post-jihad proxy wars within the country, we have to ask ourselves: what might be a reasonable way out of the current impasse for the long-suffering peoples of Afghanistan? Or what could be the relevance of these legacies (as outlined above) for imagining the shape of the future state in post-jihad Afghanistan?

A military solution, so favored by the Taliban Pushtun militia and their militant Pakistani government patrons, even if successful in conquering the non-Pushtun territories in northern and central Afghanistan, which appears unlikely in the near future, will not result in the resumption of peace and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The return of the 83 year old x-king Zahir Shah and the reinstatement of his family to the Afghan throne, lobbied for and cheer-led by the US congressman, Dana Roharbacher (Republican of Orange County, California), and many Afghan technocratic supporters of the old King in Europe and America, with alleged financial support from the California-based multi-national oil company, UNOCAL, is unlikely to get anywhere. The various peace initiatives and proposals put forth by the United Nations special envoys to Afghanistan (including the one by Dr, Norbert Holl), by Zahir Shah, and by some "independent" Afghan cultural organizations in Europe and America working towards peace in Afghanistan, seem to lack any innovative ideas and creative thought and do not hold any promise in the foreseeable future. The reason is simple-- all of these proposals contain two often tried and tired components: 1) forming a broad-based transitional central government made up of apolitical (politically indifferent?) group of technocrats, and 2) charging the transitional government with the eventual task of creating a permanently elected central government. In this, well worn formula, the entire problem is reduced to getting the parties to agree on the right kind of mix of ethnolinguistic and sectarian representation, in the so called "broad based coalition government." Unfortunately, such governments have been formed time and again over the last five years, and more may be proposed and formed during the months and years to come, but without any positive outcome to bring peace in Afghanistan.

Therefore, by way of a conclusion, and suggestion for a possible way out of the current national predicament faced by the peoples of Afghanistan, I would like to reiterate the following crucial points:

First, the old forms of modern state in Afghanistan, created by Amir Abdur Rahman, perpetuated by his Muhammadzai clansmen, and desired so strongly by most of the contenders in the current conflict in Afghanistan, although organized after the modern European models, as in most other postcolonial situations, has had little or no functional or ideological resemblances to European models. Its re-institution, with or without broad based representation, is unlikely to serve the interests of the great majority of local communities fighting to preserve their hard earned rights to local self-governance, particularly among the united Afghanistan. So, let us (Afghans) take heed from the poem of our compatriot, Abdur Rahman Pazhwak, and make sure that Afghanistan does not again become a land "where the people are imprisoned and the country is free"! Therefore, we must aspire to establish models of community self-governance and national state structures that guarantee both the freedom and liberty of all the peoples inhabiting Afghanistan, as well as, the territorial integrity and full independence of the nation itself. And, absolutely nothing short of that should do.

During a BBC Persian Service "Dialogue" program broadcast on June 1, 1997, when I discussed the issue of Pashtun domination of the state in Afghanistan, the historian Hassan Kakar vehemently objected to my views. In his protest, he recounted the presence of Badakhshanis who served as ministers of court and finance during Zahir Shah's reign (1933-1973). I do not claim that there were no members of non-Pushtun groups serving in ministerial posts in the previous regimes. Quite the contrary, the past regimes made sure, as the Taliban and Mujahideen governments of Burhanuddin Rabbani are doing that they include token "representatives" of the various ethnic communities or regions. What Dr. Kakar, and numerous others forget to ask or explore is what kind of Badakhshanis (Uzbeks, Hazaras, Heratis) were those who served in the Pushtun dominated governments of the past or in the present Taliban regime? The truth is that, at least in the case of Badakhshanis about whom I know more, they were the descendants of the children of the Mirs (local leaders of late 19th century) who were brought by Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) as part of his regional pacification programs to Kabul and kept as hostages and latter turned into "page or slave boys" (ghulam bachagan) to be trained as loyal servants of the court. These loyal servants of the court were void of any Badakhshani identity or sentiments. Indeed, they had become mankurt ("slave, who could not remember his past life"), to borrow an apt term from the famed Kirghiz author Chengiz Aitmatov.. This does not by any means indicate that the Pushtun communities were not also subjugated or abused by the otherwise Pushtun dominated state. Indeed, I have no doubt that some of them were and still are.

39.. The Talibans insistence on forcing a misguided, punitive and Pushtun tribal misunderstandings of

Islam (imported from the Northwest Frontier Provinces of Pakistan), upon the great majority of

very pious, knowledgeable, orthodox practitioners of Islam (in non-Pushtun communities as well

as many Pushtun communities in many parts of the country) is one of the main reasons for the

likelihood of the continued turmoil. Their policy of virtually "imprisoning" Afghan women in

their own homes, and denying them any and all forms of human rights and basic civil liberties, in

clear contradiction to the most fundamental teachings of Islam, is another reason why the freedom

loving Muslim peoples of Afghanistan will not stand for these un-Islamic and inhumane practices

of the Taliban. The Taliban fondness of focusing on trivial "Muslim" cum rural Pushtun tribal

customs urged allegedly by their other patron, Saudi Arabia--for example., forcing men to grow

long beards, outlawing all forms of expressive and plastic arts (music, drama, photography,

painting, sculpting) and preventing young children to play with certain musical toys, flying kites,

keeping pet pigeons-- together with their lack of any vision for addressing monumental social and

economic problems confronting the nation, are other reasons for lack of optimism for peace under

a Taliban militia controlled state.

The suggested mechanism for legitimizing the future state is also a well worn and not very

democratic--i.e, at least not based on its earlier manifestations during the twentieth century--

"traditional Afghan" institution called, the Loya Jirga (Grand National Council).

Afghan Online Press Exclusive: Interview with Mr. Omar Samad, Executive Producer of Azadi Afghan Radio

------------

SAMAD: Mr. Qazi, thank you for the opportunity to address some of the questions and issues concerning the intra-Afghan meeting held in July in Bonn, Germany, under the auspices of the Council for Reconciliation and National Unity of Afghanistan

First of all, I would like to say that I was invited by this council as a journalist to cover the events. I attended the Bonn meeting as Executive Producer of Azadi Afghan Radio and Director of the Afghanistan Information Center. I would also like to point out that a week prior to the meeting, on July 11, our radio had conducted the first pre-meeting interview with Dr. Abdul Satar Sirat, which was broadcast in the Washington DC and San Francisco bay Area communities and published in some Afghan print media as well.

I spent 4 days in Bonn, from July 18-21 until the last official day. Now I will address your questions:

AOP: I understand that four committees were selected to begin the process of forming a Loya Jirga, besides the formation of this body, have the participants of this conference given any notion of what type of government will be established in Afghanistan? For instance, will it be a republic, or a monarchy?

SAMAD: Four committees were proposed on the first day by Dr. Sirat, the coordinating committee's chairman All participants agreed to it and a brief scope of functions for each committee was also defined. This task did not include any deliberations or decisions to be made concerning the future type of political system in Afghanistan. All participants understood that their task was to map a plan or draft a series of suggestions to facilitate the holding of a Loya Jirga at a future date inside Afghanistan. They had to take into consideration the internal and external political dimensions and activities to be undertaken, the mechanism and structure of the Loya Jirga itself, the administrative and financial aspects of this goal and the security-related matters. So all decisions and deliberations focused on the Loya Jirga itself and on how to make it happen. The type of government and other issues were outside the scope of authority of this gathering and could not have been a topic. I can only assume that only a representative Loya Jirga or national assembly in the future is the sole body that can take on such an issue. Even the issue of leadership (since some were calling for former King Zahir Shah to be named national leader) was premature and the meeting did not address it as such.

AOP: Was the idea of a federal system for Afghanistan mentioned? If yes, who were its main supporters and who was most strongly opposed to such a system of government?

SAMAD: There were over 150 participants, men and women, and as our good-old Afghan tradition dictates, we probably had 151 views in there. But in reality and relatively speaking, we had a fairly accurate and diverse representation of Afghan opinions in this meeting. The only organized group not officially represented was the Taliban. You had extremist views, those masking ethnic and sectarian politics, those who had personal ambitions, those who spoke on behalf of a constituency (inside or outside the country), those who were part of, or close to a faction within the country, those who were very much in touch with realities (regardless of ethnicity) and those, mainly Afghans in the West who expressed ideas distant from realities. Some were emotional and others academic and calculated. But almost everyone was looking for a solution to this crisis. No one was openly calling for a federal system, but some people, specially in committee deliberations, were rejecting the old administrative system based on one vote or one representative per district and calling for a more democratic standard based on population and the number of district inhabitants. It was interesting to see that those coming form inside Afghanistan, again regardless of ethnicity, were much more open to new ideas and a workable formula or an updated system based on today's realities. Former civil servants and refugees from the west or those with vested interests were reluctant to accept change or adapt to newer conditions.

AOP: Do you feel the talks had any real significance, considering the denouncement of the conference by Talib representative Abdul-Hakim Mujahid?

SAMAD: I am sure Mr. Mujahid's denouncement was made on behalf of his bosses, but I believe that any move or, any step that could help Afghans come together, share ideas and make decisions by their own free will and reduce tensions and animosities is welcome and positive. Obviously, under today's conditions, you cannot ignore the Taliban who strive to gain control of the whole country. Any real peace deal would have to take them into consideration and everyone knows that, including their opposition. But it has been proven for the past 4 years that they are the least interested to talk or negotiate in good faith with others. Their supporters' policy has always been against these Afghan gatherings. The Talibs can become part of a a national process when they distance themselves from other countries' policies, which may be difficult to do. The significance of such gatherings can only be measured over time, maybe months and years. Also existing conditions inside the country or in our neighborhood have a huge impact on the future of a representative Loya Jirga. Afghans are so hurt, so politically dispersed and polarized that any such attempt at bringing together people from all walks of life, to have a civil discourse, exchange opinions, understand each other's positions and maybe even embrace each other at the end, can only be viewed as positive. We saw many instances of this happening in Bonn. Many previous attempts at gathering Afghans were either sabotaged by internal or external forces. The Herat Shura being a prime example.

AOP: This may be a long shot, but were there any talks of perhaps bringing in King Amanullah Khan's son to play a major role in the formation of a new Government for Afghanistan? Was he present in the conference?

SAMAD: No, there was no such talk. Former King Amanullah's son was not present, but I am not sure if he was invited. I did not see his name on the list of invites.

AOP: Some in the Afghan media with political motivations have only focused on the composition of the shura, not the content or the work itself. For example a TV station broadcasting to California was only concerned about the fact that there were 20 people from Dostum's group or 30 people from Massoud/Rabbani's side. Was this an issue at the meeting?

SAMAD: No this was not an open issue at the meeting, maybe an issue in the corridors and back rooms. There are still some individuals and small fringe groups especially among the expatriate refugees who see the world from a very narrow perspective. They may be educated and exposed to the values of the west, but their minds have remained quite narrow or have even shrunk in some cases. There were over a dozen people from Dostum's group, about 20 people representing the Massoud mojahedeen, including some Jamiatis, there were about a dozen people from our Hazara brothers. These were mostly people representing those regions from Herat to Badakhshan and from Kabul to Mazar and Bamian and also the United Front Alliance, as we know it today. But the question that these biased reports do not address is, who were the remaining 100-120 people or so? They were all representing our Pashtoon brothers, our technocrats, refugees and certain groups based in Pakistan and Iran and some individuals, mostly pro Zahir Shah. If the Talibs had participated, I am sure they would have sent a proportional delegation. So what is the problem? I don't see any. No one was elected by popular vote to attend this meeting, since that is impossible under present conditions; a relative representation was evident. Almost all participants, agreed on having the Loya

SAMAD: It was touching and inspiring to see Afghans from all walks of life side-by-side, talking and not fighting. It was specially moving to see our pashtun, tajik, hazara, uzbek, nuristani, baluch and other brothers and sisters who had come from inside Afghanistan, from a very difficult situation, stand next to each other, talk, joke and respect each other on equal basis. It was refreshing to see constructive criticism, truth and realities being exposed openly. It was very interesting to talk to kandahari or paktiawal pashtuns who had come from inside Afghanistan, denounce and criticize the Taliban without fear. Or some people from the opposition be critical of their leaders. But there were also scenes of so-called technocrats and expatriates, trying to sabotage the events, polarizing the minds and pushing for the ethnic or linguistic agenda. These elements finally were marginalized. . It was good to see women speak out their minds and men listen to them. The most moving scene for me was when a shaheed mujahed's widow and a living commander representing the mujahedeen came up and reminded everyone, especially those who had been away from the anti-Communist jehad, that it is wrong to look down upon the 14 years of Afghan jehad and struggle against the Soviets and communists and to bundle it all as war and give it a negative image. They said that those years are the most precious and proud years of Afghan history and should not be called years of fratricide, as some people had done. As a jehadi widow, she reminded everyone that we shouldn't let foreigners and their Afghan stooges rob us of our pride, our history and the memory of millions who fought valiantly and died for the just cause.

Jirga as a vehicle to bring Afghans together, to continue the dialogue and the contacts with internal and foreign sources, including the Taliban, to work on various administrative and informational aspects of this process, including a temporary office in Germany and a newsletter and all agreed on considering the former king's 3-point plan as a blueprint. It was also agreed that the former monarch would be playing an appropriate role when necessary in the peace process.

AOP: What were some of the more interesting, memorable moments from this gathering for you?

For more information on Afghanistan, please visit us at http://www.afghanistanvoice.org