In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Afghanistan Voice

A Monthly Publication of the APDA---Annual Subscription $10.00---New Jersey
Year One-Numbers Four&Five--Single Copy $1.00------Jan-Feb 1998

Afghanistan Voice:

A publication of

The Association for

Peace and Democracy

ForAfghanistan (APDA)

The Voice Demanding:

Democracy, Freedom,

and Dignity for All,

Seeking to Enhance the Cause of

A Free, United

Afghanistan

Editorial: This month, we have been witnessing peculiar phenomenon, Mulla Omar offering the opposition the opportunity to identify fifty 'Ulema' of their side, graduates of "recognized religious schools", to discuss with the 'Ulema' of the Taliban side the political future of Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance accepted, And then came the stipulation from the Taliban: no Shias. Then, the Alliance rejected the offer if The Shia 'Ulema' were not included.
(Continued on the next page)

An Irreplaceable Loss It is with great regret and sorrow that we report the loss of a unique political figure and a valuable asset in the recent history of Afghanistan. Dr. Mohammad Yousuf, the Afghan prime minister during the "Decade of Democracy", passed away in Germany on the 23rd of January, 1998. Dr. Yousuf worked with former King Mohammad Zahir Shah to offer hope to Afghans for a future of democratic governance and constitutional checks. Unfortunately, those hopes were shattered when, in a short time, Dr. Yousuf encountered conspiracies which cut short his reforms, Afghanistan entered an era of destabilization and Chaos, leading to limitations placed on constitutional freedoms, ultimately paving the way for Communist puppet regimes and Soviet aggression. Afghans are still paying the price for the aborting of Dr. Yousuf's bold initiatives.
May God bless his soul and grant him eternal felicity

Editorial: (Continued from page one)

On the surface, this fiasco can be attributed to the narrow mindedness or prejudiced views held by Mulla Omar which is no surprise, but the underlying dimensions of this simple stipulation are very dangerous.

It must be recognized that at the present time, the winds of political favors are blowing against Mulla Omar’s mentors in Pakistan. Recent reports indicate that Washington is impatient and somewhat at odds with the counterproductive policies of Pakistan, policies which have serious ramifications for Pakistan’s internal peace. These are the gradual increases in terrorist tendencies, religious intolerance, and drugs/kalashinkov culture which have been on the rise making the government of Nawaz Sharif face serious challenges.

(Do we need to temper these remarks by pointing out that maybe Washington is still in collusion with these counter-productive policies? We would like to think otherwise, but some latest developments, including the latest State Department report, makes one wonder how Washington cannot see the venom secreted from the madrasas in Pakistan, a sectarianism (equivalent of hate crimes in

the U.S.) that has taken many lives. Such madrasas had a direct role in the training of the Taliban whose strict interpretation of

Islam is nothing but a political move to subjugate, confuse and degrade Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been accustomed to using Afghanistan in recent times as a backdoor garbage dump. Now, we see her ruse to give the political problem of Afghanistan a sectarian twist, and to fan the fires of fanaticism. Pakistan hopes that such tactics will shift the direction of the fire of sectarian strife towards Afghanistan. If Pakistan still burns in the fires she herself has started, then she can once again plead with the West that Pakistan needs to be protected from the fires of Afghanistan.

If this maneuver fails, the diverse populations of Afghanistan, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras ( Sunni and Shia) will unite against the forces of reaction and find a political solution to the problem of lawlessness and chaos unleashed on them by their Pakistani crafty enemies. This, of course, will be a nightmare for Mulla Omar and Pakistan’s crafty schemers, for it will indicate that the Afghan people are fully aware that the problem they are facing is a political one caused by illegitimate or incapable pretenders to political power. Minor sectarian differences have nothing to do with the present chaos.

Pakistan will go to any length possible to deny the political problem she has created for Afghanistan. Pakistan will never accept that the Afghans are able to see Mulla Omar’s narrow interpretation of Islam for what it is, a myopic view that feeds on sectarian intolerance, the traditional enemy of Islam.

The United Nations and the International community may do their best to build trust between the opposing

sides in Afghanistan, but if such myopic visions and such designs stand in the way, the political future of Afghanistan and the possibility of trust can both be the casualties.

The Taliban sectarian condition in the ‘Ulema’ composition turned out to be nothing but one more stumbling block to unity and peace in Afghanistan. Does the world community see the reasons for the continued mistrust, and the real obstacles to peace?

Note: The eventual list from the Northern Alliance included “Ulema” of both sects. Where will this “Ulema List” approach will lead nobody knows. One thing is certain. The solution to Afghanistan’s political problems will be sacrificed to delay tactics

from both sides, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

APDA Efforts Directed At Inter-Afghan Dialog

One of the principle objectives of the Association for Peace and Democracy for Afghanistan (APDA) is promoting national unity among Afghans. Believing in the efficacy and advantages of a direct communication approach, the APDA has committed itself to achieve its objective through arranging meetings with Afghan groups: conducting seminars and debates, interviews, conferences, public gatherings, and by many other means of communications including publications in different languages.

APDA has taken this endeavor seriously and has accepted the responsibility to accomplish the much needed understanding and goodwill among Afghans. With sincere efforts in this line of moral duty, and as staunch advocates, the APDA has sent delegates with messages and proposals to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Europe to meet prominent Afghan personalities, Religious and Civic leaders, Scholars and the general public. In Dec. 1996 APDA delegates to Afghanistan met with leaders of the Northern Alliance. Also a delegate met with Taliban representatives in Pakistan. Another APDA delegate met with former King Zahir Shah in Rome, Italy.

In all those meetings with Afghani personalities, the APDA delegates discussed and debated openly the vital issues related to the present and future of Afghanistan. The subjects discussed included peace proposals prepared by APDA. The APDA peace proposal, because of its fairness and impartiality was generally agreed upon by all parties, with the exception of Taliban representatives who, because of lack of authority, excused themselves from accepting the proposals. The former king, Zahir Shah, found the APDA peace proposal in accord with his own three point proposal and therefore, promised full cooperation and support.

Lately, on Dec. 1997 a team of APDA delegates, headed by Dr. M.E. Fetrat, Dr. Habib Anwar, Dr. Sherief Fayez, and Dr. Sakhi Sayed Kaghaz visited Afghan groups in Europe. The APDA delegation met with prominent individuals and Afghan political, civic and humanitarian societies and associations. The objective was to open channels of communication and to request cooperation among Afghan organizations toward concerted effort to maximize effectiveness. APDA delegation emphasized Inter-Afghan dialog to achieve the common goal of national solidarity and salvation. APDA delegates visited the late Dr. Mohammed Yousuf, the former Prime Minister of Afghanistan, a hero and champion for democracy in Afghanistan, who, during his short lived post as the first non-royal family Prime Minister was the chief advocate of a democratic constitution. He praised the APDA presence and its efforts in the political arena and called it valuable and effective. He regarded APDA's efforts similar and parallel to his tireless struggles. Dr. Yousuf spent more than thiry years of his life, after his resignation from his post as Prime Minister of Afghanistan, in the cause of bringing a peaceful solution to the wars and anguish.

The APDA members were warmly received by Ms. Karola Schaaf, Amnesty International Coordinator for Afghanistan stationed in Germany. Avery active prominent personality in Europe, and advocate of human rights in general and women's rights in particular, Ms. Schaaf expressed her full support for the people of Afghanistan in achieving their rights. She also promised to be side-by-side with Afghan women fighting for their basic human rights and dignity, saving them from the misery resulting from the misinterpretation of Islam by Taliban and their advocates.

APDA met with the following members of various active Afghan Political, civic and humanitarian groups in Germany: Council for Democracy in Afghanistan; Council for National Resurrection; Society for Reconstruction, Development, and Aid for Afghanistan; Afghans National Council in Hamburg; The Afghan Community in Hamburg and others. APDA's meetings with the above Afghan organizations were in an open forum format, including question and answer sessions. The dialog and discussion was conducted in a friendly informal environment. Sessions were thought-provoking and very productive, indicating goodwill and desire for solidarity. One can conclude that in general all Afghans want cessation of war and bloodshed and yearn for peace in their Motherland. All Afghans are resentful of foreign interference in their national affairs and demand a hands-off policy. Afghans request and pray for national reconciliation and unity between brothers and sisters wherever they are. APDA will strive to reach the above objectives. We call upon all Afghans to join us and to unite for victory.

Afghanistan Voice plans to do many things in order to elucidate the many fine points of our political dilemma. We feel a scholarly debate of the issues facing us by publishing articles of historic, cultural, and political significance relevant to our immediate past is a necessary step. Having fortunately received an insightful article containing an in-depth analysis of some of our problems and possible courses of action

by Prof. Nazif Shahrani, Afghan Anthropologist, currently a resident scholar at Woodrow Wilson Center, we present it in the interest of scholarly reflection.

In the multi-ethnic Afghanistan, political discourse was censored, political parties, other than the communist, subversive ones that had strong patrons behind them, were not allowed to form, and general political consciousness was suppressed in non-privileged individuals and groups. Prof. Shahrani makes the cogent point that in Afghanistan the common people on the local community level were the protectors of our freedom and the rulers were generally instruments of foreign interests. Such rulers made use of a centralized bureaucracy often to the detriment and subjugation of local communities. It appears that Professor Shahrani has pinpointed a very central issue which might be an important factor responsible for the present conditions of crisis in leadership and, atmosphere of mistrust, and prolonged civil war. This condition may require a rethinking of required steps to be taken towards national unity. Since trust is eroded, peace and national reconciliation are very fragile and subject to foreign manipulation.

Could it be that under these conditions, a decentralized, possibly a federal form of government

(insisted on by mainly the formerly deprived strata of society that have suffered the most and who have had an equal share in the liberation of the country from the Communist domination) is the answer to our dilemma and a preserver of our freedom, independence, and possibly a much better unity?

Note: Since this article is rather long, we present it in monthly installments.

THE FUTURE OF THE STATE AND THE STRUCTURE OF COM-MUNITY GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN

M. Nazif Shahrani

The tribal model of seizure of power by a family is clearly rejected…The nation is no longer camouflage for the tribe but a political space in which democracy can be constructed… But what is a nation? Products of a European model, we are used to considering the nation as a political form that is self-evident, a kind of national culmination of all societies. It is time to realize that the idea of a nation that Europe gave to the world is perhaps only an ephemeral political form, a European exception, a precarious transition between the age of kings and the “neo-imperial” age—Jean-Marie Gueheno

The autonomous forms of imagination of the community were, and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the postcolonial misery: not in our inability to think out new forms of the modern community, but in our surrender to the old forms of the modern state—Partha Chaterjee

When in February 1989 the last soldiers of the former Soviet colonial occupation forces crossed the Hairatan bridge over the Amu Darya, and when in April 1992 the triumphant forces of the Afghan resistance took power from the puppet communist regime in Kabul, freedom-loving people in general, and the Muslim peoples of Afghanistan in particular, were euphoric that their cherished hopes for establishing an independent, Islamic government in Afghanistan would soon be realized. Much to the dismay of most Afghans, the bloody events of the last five years in Afghanistan (1992-1997), crowned by the recent carnage—in the Shomali area to the north of Kabul and in the city of Mazar-e Sharif in Northern Afghanistan—by the so-called Taliban militia, have seriously dampened any such hopes and expectations, both inside and outside Afghanistan. Indeed, the insistence by the primarily rural, tribal Pushtun Taliban—a well-armed created and financed by the now-defunct government of Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto—in trying to reimpose Pushtun hegemony by military means, and to camouflage the [Afghan] nation with the [Pushtun] tribes, especially in the self-governing non-Pushtun regions of western, central and northern Afghanistan, presents new challenges to the viability and territorial integrity of Afghanistan as a multinational state.

1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented At the international conference on Afghanistan and Regional Security, organised by the Institute for Political and International studies (IPIS), Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, 31 June-2 July 1996. It was also presented as a lecture at the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, New York University on 5 December 1996. I gratefully acknowledge the invitations from both institutions for the opportunity to discuss some of these ideas with lively audiences in both places. Two of my very bright and capable graduate students—Dr. Cynthia Werner who read the manuscript and offered incisive comments, and Catherine Petric who helped in researching sources—also deserve my thanks for their valuable assistance. However, all responsibility for the presentation of facts and interpretations rest with me alone.

The questions that I would like to raise, and briefly discuss in this chapter, are: What has brought this heroic nation of ‘freedom fighters’ (Mujahideen) to the brink of its political existence as a viable state and society? Why and how did the militarily successful jihad against the former Soviet occupation forces and their puppet Communist regimes in Afghanistan fail so miserably to form a workable national governance structure? Why did the long-established, ideologically-organized Islamic parties and organizations begin to lose their political relevance or significance, giving way to intense intercommunal proxy wars fought by coalitions of tribal, regional and/or ethnolinguistic-sectarian forces, and financed and managed by foreign powers? More significantly, what specific historical legacies and experiences, together with considerations of current socioeconomic and political contingencies (both internal and external), might prove critical for charting the future course of possibilities and alternatives for workable national (central) and community-based (village, district, province and regional) governance structures in a reunited Afghanistan? The answers to these complex and interrelated questions are by no means simple or readily explicable. But we Afghans, and our concerned friends around the world, Muslim and non-Muslim, must begin to face our national predicaments with honesty, and search for credible solutions with compassion and sincerity. It is with this hope that I wish to share these brief comments as an attempt to address some of these issues.

It is also important to state that this essay is written from my perspective as a professionally-trained ‘native’ anthropologist, a student, researcher and teacher of Afghanistan studies for some thirty years, and as an Afghan who belongs to a non-Pushtun ethnolinguistic community. 2 The voices and concerns of the non-Pushtun population of Afghanistan were muffled or utterly silenced, both in public media and academic discussions, especially inside Afghanistan, during much of this century. Any criticism of the unjust policies and practices of the Afghan governments directed against the non-Pushtun community, was condemned (and continues to be in diaspora publications) by the Pushtun-dominated state authorities and/or their spokesmen, as an act of treason and a sign of separatist tendencies. My purpose in this essay is to assess the negative consequences of policies and practices by governments (past and present) and officials under variety of regimes, during the last hundred years of our national history. My intention is not to indict the Pushtun people categorically; rather it is to criticise the oppressive policies of a state run by some of their tribesmen in their name, and for their alleged collective benefit. Further, my aim here is not simply to lay blame, but to suggest solutions to help heal the historical wounds and ensure the future national territorial and political integrity of Afghanistan as a democratic multinational Muslim state in ‘the Heart of Asia’.

A political ecological approach

Let me begin with the first question: Why from military successes to political disasters, or as Oliver Roy has recently put it, why ‘From Holy War to Civil War’? And, indeed, why the failure to establish a workable national Islamic government in Afghanistan?

Many attempts in answering these questions have been made by media pundits already. Very briefly, they include the following. Some blame the multiethnic composition of Afghanistan’s population, living in hostile steep mountains terrain and enamoured of fighting and settling scores with guns—that is, a kind of absurd biological-cum-environmental deterministic solution that says ‘Afghans can’t help it, violence is in their genes’ 3 Alternatively, some Western experts, many of the better-educated and westernised Afghan intellectuals, and some prominent Mujahideen leaders (for example Burhanudddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), blame the failure of Afghan governmebts in the past century to build and impose a strong, centralised nation-state structure as a means to integrate their constantly-feuding rural subjects—that is, nomadic tribesmen and peasants who have jealously tried

_________________________

1 See M. Nazif Shahrani, ‘Honored Guest and Marginal Man: Long-Term Field Research and Predicaments of a Native Anthropologist’ in Don D. Fowler and Donald Hardesty (eds.), Others Knowing Other Perspectives on Ethnographic Careers

(Washington,D.C.: Smithsonian Institution

Press, 1994).

3. One of the frequently-cited facts introduced

to prove the violent nature of Afghan

society is that during the twentieth century,

seven out of eleven political leaders of the

country met violent deaths (Habibullah I,

Habibullah II, Nadir Shah, Daoud, Taraki,

Amin, and Najibullah), while Amanullah,

Zahir Shah, and Rabbani, three of the

survivors, were violently deposed and

Karmal was sent into exile. This fact tells

more about the nature of political succession

in the country and the violent nature of

Afghan state than it does about the peoples

of Afghanistan.

to guard their freedom and liberty against state interferences in their local affairs. 4 A more novel thesis is offered in a recent book by David Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier, in which he suggests that ‘Afghanistan’s political chaos derives less from divisions between ethnic and religious-sectarian groups or from the ambitions of particular individuals than they do from the moral incoherence of Afghanistan itself . 5 According to Edwards, the ‘moral incoherence’ is the product of the conjunction of three contradictory and incompatible moral systems or

codes (the Deep Structure) that undergird Afghan political culture: the ultra-individualistic codes of honour (nang), the universalist moral system of Islam, and the codes of kingship-rulership of the state. He richly illustrates his analysis using narratives from the lives of a tribal Khan, a Sufi saint and a king, Amir Abdul Rahman. Neither last, nor least, and the favorite of many Afghan leaders ( I hasten to say with considerable justification), is an approach which blames foreign conspiracies against Afghanistan. This explanation suggests that foreign powers (governments both near and far, and more recently multinational corporations such as UNOCAL of California, Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia, and Bridas of Argentina), have tried to undermine the gains of a militarily successful jihad and Islamic revolution, and have interfered directly in the internal affairs of Afghanistan in order to further their own policy goals in the region by financing and managing proxy wars in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately none of these explanations is entirely satisfactory in itself. The political and military chaos in Afghanistan is not an isolated or unique phenomenon. Indeed, the tragic experiences of the long-suffering peoples of Afghanistan is part of a much wider affliction common to some types of post-colonial states and multi-national societies, especially smaller and poorer ones, which are unfortunate enough to find themselves in a geostrategic location within the post-Soviet, unipolar New World Order—for example Cambodia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sri Lanka, Azerbijan, Armenia, Tajikistan, and perhaps more nations to join the list in the not-too-distant future. Therefore, we may need to look for a broader explanation of communal conflicts and occurrences of proxy wars in smaller and poorer post-colonial multiethnic nations. Here, I have found some of Partha Chatterjee’s ideas most helpful in examining and understanding better our political miseries in Afghanistan, as well as the post-colonial miseries of other nations in comparable situations. In his book, The Nation and Its Fragments, Chatterjee theorises the sources of the intercommunal violence within the frameworks of post-colonial nation-states in the following manner:

The… autonomous forms of imagination of the community were, and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the post-colonial state. Here lies the root of our postcolonial misery: not in our inability to think out new forms of the modern community[ or identity] but in our surrender to the old forms of the modern state. If the nation is an imagined community and if nations must also take the form of states, then our theoretical language must allow us to talk about community and state at the same time. I do not think our present theoretical language [or the political ecology of the New World Order] allow us to do this. 6

2. The argument thus follows that what the country needs at the moment is the establishment of a strong centralised state structure and leadership. Needless to say, the advocates of such a view—including the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani—contend that, given the chance, they could accomplish the task alone! For texts of interviews with former Mujahideen leaders and current Taliban pretenders, news reports, and very often heard discussions of the need for the establishment of an all-powerful central government (Hukumat-i Mutamarkiz-I qawi) in Afghanistan that would disarm the population and impose its will in order to ensure the country’s national territorial integrity, see various Afghan diaspora publications such as Omaid Weekly, Caravan (bi-weekly), Afghan News and Afghanistan Mirror, printed in the US and widely distributed around the world.

3. David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age:

Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan

Frontier (Berkley & Los Angeles: Uni-

versity of California Press, 1996), p. 3

Emphsis added.

4. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its

Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial

Histories (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1993), p. 11. Emphasis added.

I agree with Chatterjee, and guehenno, that instead of accepting the nation-state ‘as a political form that is self-evident, a kind of natural culmination of all societies’ , 7 we must problematise and question the appropriateness and adequacy of the forms of post-colonial states, 8 and critically examine them to determine whether these forms of state structures are part of the problem in breeding communal violence and conflicts in multi-ethnic societies. And, if the old forms of nation-state are part of the problem in fomenting inter-communal violence, we must ask ourselves why we continue to consider such institutional forms also be a part of the solution for alleviating the crises?

In this essay, I would like to suggest a more holistic or ‘political ecological’ approach for understanding the predicaments facing not only Afghanistan, but many other similar nations in different parts of the world. By ‘political ecological approach’, I mean a systematic examination of diverse factors and forces affecting social identity formation and maintenance (individually and collectively), and the articulation of power relations among, as well as the social discourses (discursive and non-

discursive) between and among individuals and distinct groups within specific places and times (that is, particular definable political environments). The difficulty of defining ‘political environment’, unfortunately is far more complicated than that of the eco-pond or lake’, and the problems of mapping the flow charts of exchanges of power, values, goods and services are ever more complex than before. Fortunately, the so called post-colonial World System of nation-states has helped create the outlines of our ‘political ponds’ for us. At the moment, what is at issue is the political ecological viability of some of these arbitrarily defined political ponds and lakes (nations and countries within a rapidly changing global social, economic and political environment. In our case, the political pond facing problems of viability due to external political environmental pressures and excessive internal political cannibalism is the state of Afghanistan.

To address these issues we need to examine two major aspects of Afghanistan’s contemporary society, state and political ecology-—that is, the relationships of its political economy and political culture within the broader national and regional history. First, we need to identify the major sociocultural principles which provide the cultural ideas and norms for conceptualising and ordering identities and informing politics of difference between social groupings, and which articulate the relations of domination, as well as resistance, between social groups and communities. 9 Second, we need to discuss and assess , however briefly, the history of the modern state in Afghanistan and its relationship with its heterogeneous communities of citizens and their political culture during the rapidly-changing political conditions of the last one hundred years—that is, the period of Mohammadzai dynastic rule preceding Soviet intervention, the decade of the jihad struggle against Communism and Soviet occupation, and the ongoing post-Communist and post-jihad internal struggle for control of state powers. A detailed discussion of these issues remains beyond the scope of this presentation. For now, only a cursory examination will suffice.

Constitutive cultural principles, identities and political culture

The most significant constitutive cultural principles for conceptualising and ordering interpersonal relations and collective identities and difference among peoples of Afghanistan— whether rural or urban, nomad or sedentary,

5. Jean-Marie Guehenno. The End of the

Nation-State (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesta Press, 1995), p. 2.

6. A critical assessment of the old forms of

modern nation-state and their continued

relevance as effective political institutions,

especially in Asia’ Africa and Latin

America, is necessary. This is particularly

so in view of the fact that in Europe—the

original birth place of this ‘ephemeral

political form’—the nation-state is losing

much of its historic purpose in the face of

increasing consolidation of such states

within European Union. See Guehenno.

The End of the Nation-State, for details.

Also see Neera Chandhoke, The State and

Civil Society: Explorations in Political

Theory (New Delhi, SAGE Publications,

1995) and George E. Marcus (ed.) Perilous

States: Conversations on Cultures, Politics,

and Nation (Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press, 1993).

7. See Chatterjee, The Nation and Its

Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial

Histories, p. 166

tribally-organised or not—are those ensuing from the mutual bonds of family (kkkkhanadan, khanawada) and kinship (kheysh wa qawm), very broadly conceived. These social structural principles based on the idioms of kinship (patrilineal descent and affinal ties) are paradigmatic not only in defining personal identities and social relations of domination and subordination within particular social groups (beginning with family-household units), but also in defining the boundaries of community-group solidarity—the lines separating the ‘we’ from ‘they’—in all forms of intra- and inter-communal relations within dynamic and constantly-shifting contexts. 10 Members of groups and communities so organised share some common interests, in contradistinction to other similarly-conceived and competing entities, not as a result of contractual agreements, but by virtue of their prior categorically-determined inclusion in the specific contextually-defined solidarity groups within the broader social arena. The most durable and pervasive solidarity units resulting from these constitutive principles, and the entities responsible for the social production and perpetuity of these cultural principles in Afghanistan are the extended family formations (khanawada or khanadan). All other forms of recognised categorical solidarity groups, generally referred to as qawm in all major languages of the peoples of Afghanistan—which can mean liniages, clans, tribes, races, linguistic groups, religious-sectarian groups, nationalities and even nation—are similarly conceived, organised and mobilised. 11 The most striking illustration of the paradigmatic nature of these principles may be evident in the discourse of any number of Afghans when they meet each other for the first time and attempt to establish their mutual critical social coordinates at once by enquiring shuma ke asten? Ba qawm che asten? Az kuja asten? (Who are you? What is your qawm or community? Where are you from?) With answers to these critical queries, the social and spatial coordinates of individuals are easily assessed, fixed and utilized in determining the trajectories of subsequent conversations and interactions.

____

8. For an insightful discussion of similar

principles operating among Indian peasant

villagers with a caste system, see

Chatterjee, The Nation and Its… pp.164-167. 11. See Jon W. Anderson. ‘Tribe and Com-

munity among Ghilzai Pushtun’. Anthropos,

Vol. 70, 1975, pp. 575-601; Jon W.

Anderson, Khan and Khel: Dialectics of

Pushtun Tribalism’, in Richard Tapper (ed.),

The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and

Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm, 1983)

pp. 119-149; M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert

L. Canfield (eds.) Revolutions and

Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropoloical

Perspectives (Berkely: Institute of

International Studies, 1984); Robert L.

Canfield. ‘Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian

Alignments in Afghanistan’, in Ali Banuazizi

and Myron Weiner (eds.) The State,

Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan,

Iran, and Pakistan (Syracuse: Syracuse

University Press, 1986), pp.75-103; M.

Nazif Shahrani, ‘State Building and Social

Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical

Perspective’, in Ali Banuazizi and Myron

Weiner (eds.) The State, Religion, and

Ethnic… pp. 23-74; Oliver Roy. Islam and

Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1990), Myron

Weiner and Ali Banuazizi (eds.) The Politics

of Social Transformation in Afghanistan,

Iran, and Pakistan (Syracuse: Syracuse U.

Press, 1994); Oliver Roy, Afghanistan:

From Holy War to Civil War (Princeton:

The Darwin Press, 1995); and Edwards,

Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the

Afghan Frontier (To be continued…)

A Voice from Albany

Professor Abdullah Moheb Hairat, who publishes The Liberals Union and manages The Ariana Information and Publications Center in Albany, New York, has shared with Afghanistan Voice a report of some of his activities, including the recent colorful and informative publication of Afghanistan: Art-Inspiring Nights. Prof. Hairat has recently been honored by the Afghan Academy with Honorable Mention for his part in a program on Sanaii, the famous Persian Sufi poet of Ghazna.

Prof. Hairat has many Pashto and Persian books (some of them out of print and unavailable in his library at Albany. These books are for sale. Interested individuals may obtain a list by

writing to the Not for Profit Ariana Information & Publications Center at:

101 Pearl Street #W9H

Albany, NY 12207 Tel. (518) 426-8038

A list of available books is included in the

Art-Inspiring Nights.

It must be pointed out that Prof. Hairat has written to President Clinton, Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, and Senator Jesse Helms highlighting the Amnesty International Report “Women in Afghanistan: A Human Rights Catastraphe” to them, and has urged the US policy makers to take appropriate action through the UN mechanisms to bring a peaceful solution to the Afghan tragedy.

A Significant Islamic Council in Peshawar

We recently received some publications of a unique nature from Peshawar, Pakistan. A newspaper named Balaagh, published by the Afghanistan Tawheed School. The organization’s aims and methods are worthy of deep deliberation and sincere support. In this spirit, we want to publish the preamble of this organization’s constitution or platform so more Afghans will become familiar with their lofty aims and their grassroots connections inside Afghanistan. While there have been groups and organizations favored by Pakistan and given recognition and publicity, there have also existed in Pakistan patriotic Afghan movements that have insisted on principles of unity and social justice under an Islamic and democratic system. We are not fully familiar with the group’s actual practices, but APDA policy dictates that we coordinate our efforts with all non-Communist entities that genuinely seek to unify the country under the lofty teachings of Islam and see no contradiction between our Islamic identity and democratic aspirations.

It seems that the former Solidarity Council of Afghan Freedom Organizations in America (SCAFOA) had the good sense to recognize the mosaic nature of the Afghan society and invited all organizations to work together in full preservation of their identity and talent if these could be put to the service of Afghanistan’s higher good. The APDA is following the same principles and is trying to unify diverse Afghan groups, parties and organizations worldwide towards the lofty goals of preservation and development of Islamic character and democratic system of government for Afghanistan.

The Preamble below speaks for itself. We want every success to our patriotic brothers and sisters in the Islamic Council of the People of Afghanistan (ICPA).

In the Name of Allah, Most Merciful, Most Gracious

And who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation” Surah 42:38

Introduction: After the coup d’etat of 26th Saratan 1352 (17th July, 1973), and especially with the installation of the Russian puppet regime, a policy of imprisonment, relentless murdering of elite religious, political, and national personalities, and mass murders was initiated, and furthermore, the rligious, political, cultural, and social values of the country were jeopardized.

Our Muslim people made the Jihad (fight in the way of Allah s.w.t.) an armed uprising for the sake of defending everything sacred in Islam, and our national honour. The weakness of the communist regime to defend itself caused a direct invasion by the Russians. As a result, the Jihad and armed uprising against the puppet regime and the invasion became universal all over the country. This movement started right after the majority of first-line defence fighters and elite leaders were already imprisoned or martyred (shaheed), bringing into existence a variety of parties with different mentalities and tendencies towards hostility, which created misunderstandings and many inferiority complexes among the freedom fighters. Our nation became divided into different poles in their hostility and diverted the real direction of Jihad (which is to exalt the words of Allah and to establish a just Islamic regime). The continuation of this situation prepared the way for enemies to take advantage of the existing situation and to cause the parties to fight with one another. During the downfall of the communist regime, the defeated forces joined with the opposing parties in order to intensify the hostility between them.

Due to the lack of a single, strong government in the country, there was a breakdown of peace and security, conflicts among groups and parties, and intensified internal bloodshed. During these times of fighting, law no longer prevails, insecurity prevails; there are armed stubborn individuals, and the limits of jurisprudence are violated; there has been aggression on our national honour, plundering of individual and government properties, destruction of resources, and all this has created doubts against the forces of the Jihad. (Emphasis added)

Therefore, at this sensitive time, while fighting and bloodshed continue, and we face harsh economic conditions, the doors of peace and mutual understanding have shut down. Day to day, there is an increasing amount of external interference, and threat to our national unity, independency, territorial integrity, and the lives of people. It is every individual’s duty in front of the nation and his/her Islamic mission, that we make all our efforts for the sake of the greater interests of the country, and to strengthen peace and security in the region and in the world. Based upon this necessity, a number of intellectuals, and sympathetic scholars (who are hoping to bring a sincere and pure service to our oppressed nation) have established a foundation by the name of ICPA (Islamic Council of the People of Afghanistan).

The main objective of this council is to combine all sound and benevolent forces, bring unity, and exhibit the real decisions of the Muslim Nation of Afghanistan based upon religious and national duties and work towards a revival of national unity, maintaining independence, territorial integrity, stabilization of the Islamic regime, social justice and complete eradication of all kinds of prejudice, and discrimination. (Emphasis added)

ICPA has given first priority in its program to the rehabilitation of the country, which is the greatest aspiration of our nation. ICPA will make multilateral efforts so that at this sensitive time in our history, we will bring this broken ship towards the shore of salvation with the blessings and help of Allah (s.w.t.) and with consultation and support of all nations, and the cooperation of Islamic and other friendly

countries. To achieve this great and holy, national, Islamic objective, we ask for unanimity, and cooperation of all people, and all groups of our beloved nation.

The ICPA has these mottoes affixed to its publication:

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH (S.W.T)

OUR TRADITION (SUNNAH)

1. Any act of good that is for the sake of Allah (s.w.t) for the peace of his creation is our tradition (sunnah)
2. All efforts, that are made for the improvement of society provided that it is under the format of Monotheism (worshiping oneness) is our tradition.
3. Any goodness and to assist anybody or society, financially, intellectually, and anywhere for the sake of Allah’s (s.w.t) happiness without any expectation in return is our tradition.

The address of the group:

ICPA, P.O.Box 987, University Town,

Peshawar, Pakistan.

Ustad Mu’tasimBillah Mazhabi, President of Islamic Council of the People of Afghanistan

An American Observer’s Point of View

Mr. James Kellogg, a major in the army reserve, a student of military history, friend of the Afghans, and a staunch supporter of the Afghan cause during the Jihad years, sent us an article he had published in Focus in Nov. of 1980, and a more recent piece for publication. We would like to publish part of it here and the rest in future issues. Thank you, Jim.

An Islamic Basis for An Afghan Peace by: James Kellogg

The Afghan people have fought Jihad. The Afghan people have suffered in Jihad. With God as my witness, grant us the wisdom and courage to find a peace with freedom for all of the Afghan people. Amen

Because we begin the journey towards a peace for Afghanistan consistent with Islam, we need to reflect on the current situation. One needs to ask if the present situation is an acceptable result to the Afghan people after ten years of Jihad. Are an individual’s basic human rights secure from arbitrary interference or outright denial by other men? Can a man freely practice his faith according to his own conscience? As a free people, are you confident the present situation will allow your great-grand-children to live in a free and prosperous nation? Your answer to these questions should not be influenced by your apparent inability to change the current situation. As a free people, if you conclude that the current situation is unworthy of the Afghan, then with the people’s faith in Islam we can secure a better peace.

For nearly ten years after the Soviet Communist withdrawal in 1989, the Afghan people continue to suffer from this Jihad. Although my involvement with the Afghan Jihad began shortly after the Soviet invasion in 1979, I have resisted unilaterally stating my views for an Afghan peace, once Najib (the pig) was deposed. I regard the Afghan as a sovereign people who should be given the freedom to determine their own destiny. When I last spoke to the people, I foretold of the real possibility that the post-war peace might resemble the current situation. Despite the human and material destruction caused by Jihad, I decided that it was important to wait for some representative of the Afghan people to legitimatize my right to address the issues involved in finding an Afghan peace. When Dr. M. Fetrat asked me to contribute to Afghanistan Voice my ideas for an Afghan peace that I decided to break my self-imposed silence.

The Koran is the only guide the Afghan people will follow in order to achieve their individual and collective goals. Therefor, let’s consult the Koran for guidance in constructing an Afghan peace.

Sura ix, 20

Those who believe, and suffer exile and strive with might and main, in God’s cause with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God: They are the people who will achieve (salvation).

A Jihad is a holy war sanctioned by God to defend the rights of the people. Islam grants salvation of every participant in Jihad, because of one’s selfless service in defense of the community. A mujahid has no expectation of worldly gain from his actions in Jihad. The title mujahid is the highest rank a man can achieve in Islam. However, no individual can lay claim to the title Mujahid. The title can only be bestowed upon one by others of his community out of respect for his contributions to Jihad. If one’s motive in Jihad is to achieve personal gain, then he risks his own salvation in the eyes of God.

The only legitimate objective of the Afghan Jihad is to secure a peace for the people. The Afghan Jihad is incomplete because all of the people comprising the nation have not agreed upon a peace. Two broad camps currently exist in opposition to one another and dispute each other'’ claim, as to the legitimate governing authority in Afghanistan. Through-out the process, the common citizen’s opinions on a post-war peace have been largely ignored. The collective wisdom of the Afghan people would never permit the occurrence of the present situation if they had been active participants in the search for a peace.

The Afghan nation is comprised of strongly independent individuals from a variety of ethnic communities with a long history of diverse opinions concerning shared goals. How did the Afghan so quickly achieve the unity of purpose required to fight this Jihad?

The intimate faith in Islam, held by the common citizen, is the principle reason for quickly achieving unity of purpose. The Afghan understands that Islam begins with his free acceptance of Islam. Islam is an individual response to God, that cannot be imposed upon him by others. (Emphasis added)

Sura ii, 256

Let there be no compulsion

In religion; Truth stands out

Clear from error: whoever

Rejects evil and believes

In God has grasped

The most trustworthy

Hand-hold that never breaks

And God heareth

And knoweth all things.

Islam is a faith designed to impart a value system to the individual. The intent of Islam is that the good actions of the believing indivi-dual will improve the well-being of the entire community. Each individual responds to the truth of Islam in a unique fashion. In the late seventies a lone Pashtoon observed the activities of the communists and concluded that his Islamic, national and cultural values were threatened. The decision to resist was made largely independent of his neighbors decision. Across the nation, individual Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbiks and others made the same decision to resist the communists. The Afghan Jihad came out of individual choices of free men inspired by God which led to a national collective decision to fight Jihad. Every citizen had the freedom not to fight, but to the credit of the Afghan, the people chose the hard path of Jihad.

Freedom is the essential ingredient to the process of finding a national consensus to fight Jihad. Man’s free will is implied in Christianity and Judaism, but is directly stated as a necessary condition of Islam, and man must consider how his actions impact on another man’s free will.

Sura xviii, 28

Say, “the truth” is

From your Lord:

Let him who will

Believe, and let him

Who will reject (it):

For the wrong-doers, we

Have prepared a fire

Whose (smoke and flames),

Like the walls and roof

Of a tent, will hem

Them in: If they improve

Relief they will be granted

Water will scald their faces.

How dreadful the drink!

How uncomfortable a couch

To recline on!

The free will granted to man also involves one’s acceptance of personal respons-ibility for the consequences of his actions. Men of faith seem to be preoccupied in de-manding one’s obedience to rituals assoc-ated with faith. I simply do not acknowledge this is a proper activity of mortals. For example, an individual’s decision to be clean-shaven does not interfere with another’s faith in Islam. The demand that men of faith grow an ungroomed beard is a fundamental denial of man’s free will and is not permitted in Islam.

As an extreme example, Najib throughout his tenure as president of Afghanistan declared he was a Muslim. Try as I might, I cannot with absolute assurance declare this a false statement. Najib'’s faith in Islam or lack of faith is within the province of God and not a right granted to mere mortal.

It is within the right of a community to judge the actions of an individual in the context of his society and culture. Najib participated in the indiscriminate murder of his fellow citizens. Across the Afghan nation, there are countless individuals who can bear witness to the consequences of Najib’s actions. A community of men can legitimately judge man’s actions, but not his faith.

Throughout history, men of all faiths (Islam, Christianity, Judaism) have universally regarded murder as absolute sin. The thought process that leads one to such a conclusion is as follows. If the act of murder is granted to the entire community, would the result cause the community harm or good? Obviously, general harm would be done to the community if all men purposely murdered each other. Therefore, the individual act of murder is immoral. In addition, if all men in a community decided to be clean shaven what is the effect on the community? I am hard pressed to see how the community would be harmed. Therefore, the individual’s decision to be clean shaven is not immoral. Each day, men make choices in his actions and if those actions of questionable virtue were analyzed in a similar fashion, then men would generally make the right choice.

A search for an Afghan peace consistent with Islam requires an honest approach of human nature.

Sura iv, 79

Whatever good, (O man!)

Happens to thee, is from God;

But whatever evil happens

To thee is from thy (own) soul.

And we have sent thee

As an apostle

To (instruct) mankind

And enough is God

For a witness. (To be continued.)

Excerpts from:

INTERVIEW WITH US CONGRESSMAN

DANA ROHRABACHER (R-CA)

CONDUCTED BY OMAR SAMAD,

AZADI AFGHAN RADIO BROADCAST

12/27/97

Q: Congressman, following your recent trip to Central Asia and your meetings with some Afghan leaders, what is your latest assessment of the Afghan situation?

A: Afghanistan has a tremendous opportunity now to move forward and finally put behind the conflict that has ravaged its people over the last two decades. People and participants are sick and tired of fighting...some unsavory characters are out of power. We have recently discovered that some of the people I even thought were good people have some basic problems, like General Malik, who may or may not have been involved in some very bad decisions or activities in term of what happened to his prisoners.…

Q: Congressman, the US administration seems to be a bit more involved nowadays and maybe eager to find a solution. How do you compare current State Department attitude and policy with Mr. Inderfurth now in charge, versus a few months ago, when Robin Raphel was responsible for the region?

A: There have been statements that are very high up in our government to indicate that there is some understanding of some of the things going on in Afghanistan and how they are unacceptable. This mainly concerns the Taliban’s approach and policies over the people living in areas under their control. (Secretary of State) Madeleine Albright, Mrs. Clinton and the President himself have commented that the Taliban’s oppression of women is totally unacceptable. Those statements have encouraged the administration to get involved in a way that they haven’t been in the past.

Q: is only their attitude toward women that is worrisome or are there other Taliban dispositions that are also of concern?

A: I am deeply worried about a number of issues. To this administration, the Taliban’s basic philosophy of not permitting women any freedom whatsoever, is what has mobilized the administration against the Taliban...

Q: With Mr. Inderfurth now in charge, do you see the policy on the right track to help solve the crisis?

A: For the first time the US has a policy of trying to get involved one way or the other. I don’t know what the involvement is right now and I am not sure what direction Mr. Inderfurth will go. I hope all parties understand that what’s needed is a government of national unity. Whether or not it’s the (former) King, and I’m not saying it has to be the King, we need a leader to step forward and pledge to the people that he will not be a leader for more than two years until elections and will lead a government that will include the Taliban, all the forces in Northern Afghanistan and actually those in the South who disagree with the Taliban...I believe that the Taliban are the only ones now that are not accepting this formula for a solution. I think that the King is a good candidate, but if another leader steps forward, then perhaps.. to me that’s the solution.

Q: With ever-changing political and military realities in Afghanistan, do you think that the role that could be played by the former King would also have to change and adapt itself to circumstances?

A: I absolutely do, I think that Zahir Shah as well as other leaders who remember the old days, have to understand the old days are over in Afghanistan. Instead, they have to have a commitment to the well-being of the Afghan people today, under today’s circumstances... Zahir Shah and any other leader would have to realize that the elections that will take place in Afghanistan will not only permit the people to select their national leader but also be aimed at allowing the people to elect their provincial leaders. Each city and each village should elect their own leader and these should not be people appointed by a central government. Instead there should be a genuine democracy... Before various groups took up arms to fight various causes over the years, now the king and everyone else would have to realize, those people who have been fighting for their own freedom and their own survival over the last 30 years, are not going to just lay down their weapons and be told by someone from a distance what to do.

Q: What are some shortcomings and errors on the part of the former King and his advisors that have prevented a more active role?

A: Every leader in Afghanistan, like every leader in the world, are human beings and have shown shortcomings...In Afghanistan, because it has been such a volatile situation, when a leader makes a mistake, it becomes a tragedy. The King’s major mistake is that he has not been personally involved as he should have been. He’s continued to try to remain above the fray, thus his hands are clean, but he has not been working as hard as others to relieve the suffering of his people...

Q: How do you view the so-called Frankfurt and Istanbul political process that has been started?

A: I believe that any meeting like those two that are aimed at trying to create a government of national unity, which is one of their main goals, is good. No one is trying to exclude the Taliban or any other faction ...these meetings are an effort to find that formula and to try to bring in people. If there is a problem, it’s that they should be bring in more people...The Taliban have to understand that they cannot superimpose their will on all the people of Afghanistan. If they continue to try to do this outside of an election.. and if they deny a free election, they are saying that the people will support them, and they are instead forcing their religious beliefs on others. That will not work... (All emphasis added)

Q: you don’t think that the Istanbul process has stalled at this point?

A: No, I don’t. I think the process will go on, because it’s an on-going process.

Q: Turning to another issue; I just interviewed a spokesperson for Bridas, Unocal’s Argentinean rival in the pipeline project. They are saying that they are in this run for the long haul. What do you think of their reaction? Also, what do you think of Unocal’s recent hosting of the Taliban delegation in the US? Was that the proper thing to do?

A: the pipeline is a project of utmost importance to the future of Afghanistan. If the people can establish a transitional government under the King or someone else,.... the pipeline will provide the funds necessary for the re-building of Afghanistan itself. Those funds will help provide resources for re-establishing civil order in Afghanistan and also the development of resources in Afghanistan itself.

Q: Does it matter if it’s Unocal or Bridas building this pipeline?

A: I think...I am not going to come down on any side. It’s up to the people of Afghanistan to decide what the best deal is and who they would like to work with. But I am not mad at Unocal because of the Taliban. I think Unocal has done it’s best to try to keep in touch with all factions and as long as Unocal is not just focusing on the Taliban but instead focusing on maintaining a good relationship with all the factions that are now at play, then it’s alright. However, if Unocal decides to pick a winner and the Taliban have won, then I think it would be doing a very bad disservice to the people of Afghanistan.

Q: Why is that congressman?

A: Well, because I think the Taliban have not won. They have as much control as they will ever be able to have. In fact, I think that if they continue to try to superimpose their religious views on people who do not agree with them, they will eventually lose power all together. Instead the Taliban should become a religious force...rather than trying to be a political force forcing people to accept certain religious beliefs that may not hold.

Q: How can such a change occur...how can a military force backed by foreign sources change...

A: yes, the way this can happen is that most of the people involved with the Taliban, who are sincere and devout Moslems...they are now being manipulated by outside forces that are trying to use them for political purposes. Once the fighters understand that religious convictions should be more important than holding power politically, they should become a religious force acceptable to the people...

Q: Many Afghans view Pakistan’s role and policies toward Afghanistan, at least in the past 5 years or so, as antagonistic, hegemonic and destructive. Case in point, Gulbudin Hekmatyar and then the Taliban, both propped up, equipped and used by Pakistan to pacify and dominate Afghan-istan...what do you think went wrong and Pakistan chose this path?

A: The people of Pakistan are directly related to a larger portion of the Afghan people than any other outside power... Throughout Afghanistan people are related in ethnic ways to their neighbors. It shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone that the neighbors have a direct stake in what is going on. What has happened is that the neighbors got too involved. Not just the Pakistanis, but others also, have been far too involved trying to manipulate the situation inside of Afghanistan, rather than just to provide help for people who are struggling to regain some semblance of civil government. We have people on the outside, specially in Pakistan, who are trying to determine what that civil government and its policies would be.

______

Words of Praise for our Web Site

Our web site, AfghanistanVoice.org , has been very well received by the visitors. From Australia, we got the comment, “Great Site!“, and a general praise of the content.of the site.

An Afghan visitor (with great kindness) wrote:

Hamwatani Mohtaram wo Girame Ghazanfar Salaam:

I just visited your wonderful web site and I am so proud that we have real Afghans on the net. The visitor then complained that the ”Tanzemha” and “false Islamic groups” sold out our country to foreign interests, thus changing the tolerant, united character of our country. The visitor continued saying, “I would like to see your web site as a voice of all Afghans regardless of their idea, language, ethnic background… I personally admire your excellent job and wish you all the best.” “Woraz Mo Nicmorga” (Signed)

We are very thankful to these and many other similar encouraging comments. We assure our friends that we will do our best to promote unity of purpose among the Afghans to see Afghanistan come out victorious from her present ordeal. We invite you all to help us in whatever way you can to realize this worthy goal.