In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
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Finally, the United States got serious about Afghanistan and sent a top US diplomat, Bill Richardson, the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, along with Karl Inderfurth and another official to the country to hold talks with Afghan warring parties and other concerned groups. This was a visit by a high ranking American official to Afghanistan in twenty years, and the selection of the U.S. Representative to the United Nations for the job underscored the U.S. determination to help bring the United Nations efforts in the direction of a political settlement to the Afghan problem closer to reality.
The mistreatment of the UN aid workers recently at the hands of the Taliban militia led to Kofi Annan Representative and Unicef chief, Carol Bellamy, going directly to Kabul and talking to Mulla Rabbani, Taliban official in Kabul. The issues are still not resolved with Mulla Omar, the Taliban strongman in Kandahar and a UN delegation may be going again to Afghanistan to try to clear the outstanding issues with the Taliban. The Taliban rediculous rules which they call Islamic, "Shari'a" rulings about gender, foreign aid workers, and a host of other issues that have no precedence anywhere in the Islamic world, had made life difficult for the U.N. aid workers so much so that they stopped their operations in Kandahar.
The Richardson trip with the weight that it carried especially in advance of President Clinton's trip in a month or so to the area (Pakistan, India, Bangla Desh, China, and more) addressed many points and actually brought the belligerent groups to the negotiating table.
While there are still many hurdles in the way, the very weight that the US is applying has made Pakistan openly announce that even though she has recognized the Taliban regime, she is impartial! in the Afghan affair, possibly with a bit more sincerity. This in itself has made the talks being held in Islamabad somewhat palatable to many who have had misgivings in the past about the efficacy of any meeting in Pakistan. Given the dubious role Pakistan has played in the past, the skeptics would see this as yet another exercise in futility and incapable of producing any positive results. Nevertheless, the American initiative and the hope that America's role will be a positive one have created an atmosphere of optimism.
After all, Mr. James Ngobi of the UN chairs the talks, OIC is actively present, and Mr Richarson has sent a couple of reminders to the two Afghan warring sides that he expects them to stick to their promises made to him in Kabul and in Shiberghan. With some interruptions in the talks because of the Taliban delegation having limited powers and their need to consult the big boss, surprisingly, the talks led to actual agreement on the composition of a Forty-member Ulema Commission. The Northern Alliance got the "concession" as Mr. Hakim Mujahid called it, namely that the term Ulema can include more than just graduates of religious schools. Though this is a thorny issue and the Taliban may not remain willing to include in the definition more than graduates of Islamic schools because they do not want technocrats to be included in the Commission or having any say in the future destiny of Afghanistan.
At this point, Afghans are so tired of twenty years of war and chaos that they might be willing to put up with any half measure. People have become very disillusiond with religious or Jehadi leaders for making Afghanistan lose precious time for reconstruction and redevelopment after the departure of the former Soviet Union because of their becoming instruments of foreign, especially Pakistani designs which have led to utter destruction of the country. Now that the powers are working to bring peace in the country, seeing that their interests in oil and pipelines from Central Asia can be met by a patchwork of coalitions of extremists, even that is better than nothing. A woman in Afghanistan put it very nicely when, according to a report, she said to Carol Bellamy that her first priority was peace, and that she could put up with the Taliban ridiculous rules concerning women for the sake of the children. "We want peace, and work and the doors of schools open for our girls." Although Carol Bellamy, after meeting in Kabul with Mulla Rabbani, Taliban second in command came back empty handed, at least, she met with the women groups in Kabul and gained a clear understanding of the terror that is prevailing in Kabul and other areas under the Taliban control. She heard the denial and excuses from the Taliban where women's rights are concerned. The Medieval minded Taliban, despite condemnation of their ways from many Islamic circles are convinced they are following the precepts of Islam and that everybody else is wrong. That they, chauvinists very difficult to reason with, have come to this point that they sit down with their opponents to discuss issues of peace is a great achievement.
There are many issues not addressed by this "Steering Committee", and everyone in the Talks has a different idea of what is to be achieved. Some feel that the Forty-member Religious Scholars Commission will make the rule of the Taliban brand of Islam binding on all. Others feel that this may lead to a Loya Jirga which will recommend the proper course for solving the legitimacy issue of the ruling body and lead the country toward lawful governance. It may all depend on what the U. S. and the U.N. mean by broad-based government and on what it will be that the Six plus Two formula will consider acceptable.
Yes, there are other issues such as cease- fire agreement from both sides, issues of prisoner exchanges, and issues of lifting the blockade that the Taliban have imposed on the Central Afghanistan making Hazarajat face starvation. The U.N. is complaining that thousands will starve because of the blockade and that the Taliban are using delaying tactics to keep the issue unresolved until the formation of the Religious Peace Commission. So it is unlikely the Steering Committee will reach any agreement on this issue.
But the major issues that will hang in the balance pending the formation of the Forty-member Commission are very tough ones. There are the issues of drugs and terrorism. Taliban sources insist they have not promised Mr. Richardson anything concerning the ex-Saudi multi-millionaire Osama bin Laden. One report said that the Taliban will keep him "under wrap" as he is the "guest" of the Taliban. What about neighbor influences and sometimes mischief from them? Arms deliveries to warring sides? The U.N. has been somewhat vociferous about this issue.
And from the Afghan point of view, the most important issue is the change that the Taliban have brought to the name of Afghanistan (Republic to Emirate). Most observant Afghan intellectuals see in this a reversal of Afghan independence gained with years of sacrifice and hardship. The Taliban have played with the pride of the nation by accepting the status of Emirate, i.e.,client statehood.
Pakistan's past actions speak more clearly than her recent words. After all, didn't Pakistan arm Hekmatyar to play the Pashtun card in her "divide and rule" policy, to destroy Kabul, and then when that puppet failed in complete destruction of everything Afghan, the Taliban were created to take Afghanistan back to the Middle Ages? Pakistan's foreign minister Gohar Ayub knowing the delicate issue assured Afghans and foreign observers at the start of the Islamabad talks that Afghanistan is a free country and Pakistan is only doing her best to solve the Afghan crisis, but the truth of their intentions sometimes comes out in subtle ways such as their insistence on the empty seat formula for Afghanistan in the United Nations or when Pakistani Finance Minister referred to Afghanistan as Pakistan's fifth province! Maybe that is why the Taliban are adamantly opposed to the acceptance of technocrats in the Commission composition.
However, Pakistan should take note that Afghans did not go under the British tutelage nor under the yoke of the former Soviet Union. It would be sad indeed if Pakistan with shortsightedness ignored this fact of history and compounded the present miseries of this valiant nation by continuing to resort to dreams of Talibistan..
What about women's education issuee? The U. S. government came under a great deal of pressure from the European and world community as well as from the American women who were appalled by the Taliban reactionary policies at this juncture of world history, the turn of the millenium. Would the Commission of Religious Scholars take up all of these issues? Wishful thinking on all sides. One thing is certain. The future is uncertain.
The Association for Peace and Democracy for Afghanistan is an Afghan political organization based in the United States of America in the state of Virginia. We have representatives throughout the United States, Europe and other regions and most of our members consist of Afghan intellectuals and technocrats.
In November of 1996, the Association for Peace and Democracy for Afghanistan, in accordance with a series of peace efforts, sent a delegation to Afghanistan to work with all beligerent factions and parties to bring unity and find a solution to the ongoing war.
The Association for Peace and Democracy for Afghanistan in appreciation of all recent peace efforts to end the suffering of the Afghan peaople, end the war and bring a lasting , stable and just peace, proposes the following:
1. An end to interference by neighboring countries and their supporters, who seek to prolong and intensify the war. Only attempting to control air supply routes for weapons and other war goods will be ineffective, since there must also be a stop to ground transportation, and this, as evidenced by past experiences, is not possible.
2. An announcement and implementation of cease-fire, and therefore, the prevention of arms buildup or any other war preparations during the cease-fire by any and all factions. In relation to this, a gathering of religious scholars from both sides will only serve to be a preliminary step in negotiations.
3. A start of peace talks between the warring sides, under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference.
4. A release of all prisoners of war by all factions and the opening of roads without restrictions.
5. A demilitarization of all cities and major centers of population, so that they will not be in the firing range of the different factions.
6. A placement of an international peace keeping force, under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference, in cities and strategic areas.
7. A transfer of power to locally elected bodies which will temporarily administer city governments.
8. A creation of an urgent Jirga, with the participation of all notable and important Afghan individuals and representatives of all ethnic groups and social classes, as the best possible representative National Body to form a temporary, non-factional government.
9. A call on the world community, most importantly the United States of America, to send and increase humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, especially to those areas which are in dire need.
10. A strong and determined effort to control and cease terrorist activities and end the cultivation and export of illegal drugs.
The introduction and appropriation of a centralized state apparatus, based on the British Indian colonial model, by a Durrani Pushtun tribal dynasty in Afghanistan, initiated a characteristically new model of state-society relations. Until today, the nature and structure of this evolving form of post-colonial state and its relationship to civil society17, has had a powerful and lasting effect on the political consciousness and imagination (or lack thereof) of the peoples of Afghanistan. Also important, at least sociologically, has been the tenacious application and utilization of the constitutive principles of family and kinship (khanadan and qawm wa kheysh) mores and the ties of loyalties by the rulers of Afghanistan in their state building efforts. This, however, has not been without paradoxical results for the national political processes. Therefore, I believe a brief discussion of these issues could shed some light on the current political predicament facing the peoples of this beleaguered Muslim nation.
The Development of a Strong Dynastic State and the Destruction of Self-Governing Communities:
The foundations of a modern centralized state in Afghanistan were laid under the auspices and political tutelage of British Indian colonial empire, with direct military and financial assistance. This began with the reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1832-1863), and culminating with the reign of his grandson, the "Iron Amir", Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901). The phrase, "Iron Amir"-- an infamous description of the violent and oppressive character of the so called, "founder of modern Afghanistan"-- was popularized by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century British authors and is widely adopted by others, including Afghan writers. Toward the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1879-1880), General Roberts, the Commanding Officer of the British occupation forces in Kabul, upon being informed of Abdul Rahman Khan's reappearance in Afghan Turkestan (after decade-long self-imposed exile in the Tsarist Russian occupied city of Tashkent), telegraphed British authorities in India on January 10, 1880 and suggested that they should cautiously open communication with Sardar (Prince) Abdul Rahman, in whom, the British General thought, "it was just possible might be found 'our most suitable instrument' [for governing Afghanistan](18) indeed, General Roberts was correct in his assumption, and Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan proved to be the "most suitable [political] instrument" for British policies in Afghanistan(19).
Thus, the Muhammadzai dynastic centralized state was established during the last two decades of the 19th century by Amir Abdur Rahman(20), who mortgaged the control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs to Britain in return for considerable cash and artillery "to establish himself" as the founder of "modern Afghanistan"21. The Amir initiated and successfully implemented a state policy that aimed to disarm systematically and overwhelm militarily existing forms of autonomous communities, allegedly in order to create and maintain national unity. He strongly favored the formation of a powerful centralized state to control and effectively rule over a much weakened and brutalized civil society. The Iron Amir's policies for accomplishing his state building objectives were blatantly discriminatory, violent and brutal, especially against those non-Pushtun ethnolinguistic communities and against Pushtun tribal communities whom he thought might oppose his direct rule in their territories22. His wars of pacification against the Shi'a communities in the Hazarajat and against the peoples of Kafiristan (renamed Nuristan following their conquest and forced conversion to Islam) in eastern Afghanistan are legendary in their brutality and oppression23. In Afghan Turkistan, Kohistan (Shomali). Herat and the eastern Ghilzai Pushtun tribal territories, Amir Abdul Rahman destroyed countless local communities by decimating their leadership through executions, confiscation of properties, exile or imprisonment in the capitall, Kabul24. He also carried out an active policy of internal colonialism by relocating Pushtun peasants and nomads (both forcibly and by means of offering free confiscated lands and other financial incentives) in Afghan Turkestan. Amir Abdul Rahman also opened up Hazarajat and Badakhshan pasture lands in central and northeastern Afghanistan to Kandahari maldar (pastoral nomads) for use during the summer months25. In this remarkable project of "state building", the "Iron Amir" relied almost exclusively upon the support of his own immediate family, lineage, clan, tribe and segments of the larger loyal Pushtun communities. Needless to say, his loyal kinsmen and supporters were amply rewarded, often at the expense of "other" tribal or ethnolinguistic-sectarian communities, especially in Hazarajat and in Afghan Turkestan, who lost pastures and agricultural lands and property.
The ever growing organs of the state, especially those charged with economic extraction, and control and punishment, were staffed by either the Amir's relatives or his loyal "royal" clients from various non-Pashtun ethnic groups and Pashtun tribes alike. As such, the state was run as a dynastic patrimony. Indeed, the dominant constitutive principles of paternalism, nepotism, tribalism, and ethnic-regional favoritism suffused all aspects of state and society relations. By the turn of the century and the end of Amir Abdul Rahman's rule (1880-1901), the absolute dominance of his family and its larger Muhammadzai clan of the Durrani tribes of the Pashtun had been indisputably established in the multi-ethnic Afghan state. Indeed, Amir Abdul Rahman had successfully adopted "the tribal model of seizure of power” and camouflaged the newly-cobbled together multiethnic nation with his own tribe26. Also, in reference to the new paramount national chieftains, the Muhammadzai Pushtun dynasty of the Iron Amir, a new hierarchy was formed which re-aligned communities, aqwam (based on kinship, tribal, language, sectarian and regional affiliations) with differential access to strategic state resources. In effect, the autonomous power of local communities, and the relative balance of power among communities themselves, as well as the prevailing balance of forces between them and the central government, were changed drastically in favor of the more powerful, emergent "modern" dynastic state.
The continued domination of the centralized state by the members of a particular family and tribal-ethnic community was not possible with the internal revenues and national resources of the country. Instead, throughout this century the government leaders increasingly relied on foreign military and economic assistance from willing and able outside patrons (earlier exclusively British, but later Soviet, European, American and some Arab sources) regardless of the many changes of regimes. That is, the pattern of maintaining a strong centralized domestic control over the population through the assistance of foreign powers (often potential enemies of the nation, such as the former Soviet Union, and currently, Pakistan) has been emulated by all regimes in Afghanistan during the past century: beginning with the dynastic shift from Amir Abdur Rahman's family to the Musahiban family (1929-1973) of Muhammad Nadir Shah-- following the fall of the reformist king, Amir Amanullah (1929), in the hands of a Tajik rebel, Habibullah II (Bacha-i Saqaw) during a brief interregnum (1929)-- to Daoud's republic (1973-78), the Khalq-Parcham Communists (1978-1992), the Mujahideen governments headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi and Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-96), to the current militant contenders for the state power, the Taliban militia (from 1996). All of these regimes--monarchic, republican, Communist, and self-styled Islamic-- have been molded and modeled after the familiar old forms of centralized nation-state camouflaged with the "tribe" of those in power. That is, throughout the twentieth century and the many violent changes of government in the country, the over centralized administrative structure, and the overwhelmingly punitive, corrupt and extractive functions of state have remained constant. As an Afghan proverb aptly expresses it, khar amu khar, faqat palaanesh tabdel meshud (the donkey remained the same, only its tackle changed)--that is., the structure and functions of state and its hostile relations with the society did not change, only the rulers changed places. Therefore, I contend that it is the negative consequences of these old forms of the modern state in Afghanistan that lie “at the root of our [that is., Afghanistan's] postcolonial misery"27.
(17)During the past two decades considerations of "civil society" and its relationship with the state have occupied a prominent place in political theory. However, as to what civil society is, and what is the nature of relationship between civil society and the state, and whether there is a civil society outside of Western democracies, there are lively debates in progress: see, for example, Jean-Francois Bayart, “Civil Society in Africa”, in Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa: Refliction on Limits of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 109-125; Michael Bratton, “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa” World Politics, vol. 41, no. 3, April 1989, pp. 407-430; and Jillian Schwedler (ed.), Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995). For the purposes of this essay, I am relying on the definitions of, and relationship between, the concepts of state and civil society as articulated by Neera Chandhoke, The State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory, p. 9:
“...we need to understand that states are much more than governance. For states invariably seek to control and limit the political practices of society by constructing boundaries of the political. The state attempts in other words to constitute the political discourse. However, politics are articulatory practices which mediate between the experiential and the expressive are not only about controls and laying down of boundaries. They are about transgressions of these boundaries and about the reconstitution of the political. the site at which these mediations and contestations take place; the site at which society enters into a relationship with the state can be defined as civil society.
The values of civil society are those of
political participation, state
accountability, and publicity of
politics....The inhabitants of this sphere
is the rights bearing and judicially defined
individual,i.e., the citizen. And protection of
the members of civil society is encapsulated
in the vocabulary and institutions of rights”.
See also Andrew Arato, “ Civil Society vs
the State”, Telos, vol. 47, no. 1, 1981, pp. 23-
47; Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, “ Social
Movements, Civil Society and the Problem
of Sovereignty”, Praxis International, vol. 4,
no. 3, 1984, pp. 266-283; Ernest Gellner, “
Civil Society in Historic Context”,
International Social Science Journal, no.
129, 1991, pp. 495-510; Jean Cohen and
Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political
Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
18. Windham. Precis on Afghan Affairs, p. 41.
Emphasis added.
19. For a revealing description of the events leading to the Viceroy and Governor-General of British India offering "the Amirship" to Abdul Rahman Khan, and formally installing him to the post of Amir of Kabul on July 22, 1880, see The Precis on Afghan Affairs, pp. 40-89, a published summary of all the secret communications--from the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879 to the conclusion of Durand Mission in November 1893-- between British officials in Kabul and their headquarters in India and England.
20. (3)The "Iron Amir" was given considerable military and financial assistance by British Indian government to create a strong buffer state in Afghanistan against any potential threats from the encroaching Tsarist Russian colonial empire to the north--that is, western Turkestan. The modern British weapons, however, were only used by the Amir to brutalize his own subjects, the so-called "internal enemies of the state", and never in defense of the nation against threats from the outside. The legacies of this well established strong centralized government has unfortunately persisted throughout this century in Afghanistan . For further details, see Mir Ghulam Muhammad Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masir-e Tarikh (Kabul: Dawlati Matba’a, 1967); Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan; Shahrani, “State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective”; and Farhang, Afghanistan dar Panj Qarn-e Aker.
21. Windham, Precis on Afghan Affairs, p. 77.
22. See Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan: the Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, p. 10.
23. All of these atrocities were committed in the name of 'fostering Afghan national unity' and promoting the 'dignity of Islam' (Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan: the Reign of Amir 'Abdo al-Rahman Khan, p. 10), and are reminiscent of what is being done by the Taliban Pushtun militia against non-Pushtuns in the country today.
24. Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan: the Reign of Amir 'Abdo al-Rahman Khan, p.48 reports an account from one of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan's alleged friends from his days of exile in Russian Turkestan Kata Khan Uzbek ordered his servants.to fetch all his household property. In reply to a question from the amir, 'Kata Khan said that "the dignity of a governor in Afghanistan was the confiscation of his property and the loss of his life; in order to save his own [life] he preferred to sacrifice his property beforehand."'
25. This policy of internalcolonialism was continued by Amir Abdul Rahman's descendebts without interruption. As a result many Pushtun peasant and maldar communities are established in northern Afghanistan, especially in Badghis, Faryab, Maimana, Jawzjan and Shiberghan in the northwest, and Baghlan and Kunduz in the center. The recent declarations of solidarity and loyalty to Taliban Pushtun militia in the north by commanders Bashir Baghlani and Arif Khan (Kunduzi) are the fruits of Pushtun colonialism being reaped in Afghan Turkestan.
26. Guehenno, The End of the Nation State, p. 2.
27. Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, p. 11.
(To be continued in the next issue)
14 February 1998
Members of the Cultural Society of Afghanistan (CSA) in Northern California gathered in an urgent meeting and asked the President of the Association to forward the following written protest to Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
According to the article by the famous Pakistani columnist, Mr. Ahmad Rashid in "the Nation" printed daily in Lahore, the Finance Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Sar Taj Aziz has declared Afghanistan to be recognized as Pakistan's fifth province from an economic perspective.
This claim though unfit for the words of a Minister, manifests the utmost evil intent of the government of that country towards her Muslim neighbor: an intent that for years continues to mount political pressure and economic hardship as a result of its hegemonic and supremacist politics toward Afghanistan; an intent that has caused it for the last four years to gather its murderous militia force called the Taliban from the various provinces and after arming and financing them, to dispatch them into Afghanistan… The purpose has been to close the doors of education and enlightenment and open the gates of ignorance and darkness; to wipe out civilization and history and to bring reactionary tendencies and backwardness; to cast fratricidal hatred, corruption and sedition among the fraternal Afghans; to slaughter women, children, men and elders; to castrate and skin men; and finally, to commit mass killings. In sum, every international norm, covenant, principle and charter has been violated by the Taliban. Most of it has been reflected globally, and we are certain the Prime Minister is aware of all the atrocities.
Mr. Nawaz Sharif,
If the Ministers of your Cabinet are unaware of the historical Jihad waged by the Muslim Afghan nation, at least you were able to witness-despite your young age-the freedom loving patriotic Afghan nation, to have pursued and pushed back the Soviet Empire just as its ancestorsss had pursued the British Empire, despite lack of material tools.
Mr. Nawaz Sharif,
If the Taliban-as the murderous Pakistani militias were able to last this long in our country-it is only because of their guise under the holy name of Islam and pretext of bringing security. Now that their lies and deception has become exposed to everyone, you hear and the world sees that they are doomed to failure. Even dispatched Pakistani officers cannot save them from the grips of Afghan patriots. Now they run away leaving hundreds and thousands of their dead and casualties behind. The Afghans bury these dead in mass graves.
Mr. Nawaz Sharif,
The Cultural Association of Afghanistan forwards its protest to you as the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the members of your Cabinet to refrain from saying the sort of things that is beyond the realm of execution by the already shaky government of Pakistan. Your Ministers must be told that had it not been for the assistance already rendered by the Afghans, the former governments of Pakistan may have by now been crushed by the attack of its eastern neighbor. The members of your Cabinet must know that Afghanistan has never been a province of any country. The truth of this may be obtained from the military archives of the Soviets and the British and then forwarded to the members of the Cabinet, particularly, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, the Foreign Minister and Mr. Sar Taj Aziz, the Minister of Finance.
Mr. Prime Minister,
Your words regarding the destruction and devastation that has been brought upon Afghanistan will not be forgotten by our nation. Be certain that the fire you and your governments and cabinet members have started in Afghanistan and continue to fuel, will one day engulf you and your cabinet members.
Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, We wish that the Pakistani governments would have realized the truth of approaching the Afghan nation with friendship rather than enmity. That would have guaranteed a formidable neighbor next to Pakistan, assisting her on bad days. Too bad that the thought of material gain and the unnatural tendencies by Pakistani statesmen closed their eyes and gave way to enmity in a way that the flames will turn around and befall them.
Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister, it is still early. You can still convince yourself, members of the Cabinet and dignitaries within the Pakistani ISI to put a halt to the enmity toward the Afghan Muslim nation and instead desire peace and stability and friendship. This is vital for the security of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the region and the world at large. The members of your Cabinet and other high officials in your government must be enlightened that Afghanistan is not Pakistan's fifth province. Rather, it is a free and independent state.
With Highest Compliments
Ghulam Hazrat Koshan
President,
Cultural Society of Afghanistan (CSA)
P.O. Box 4511 Hayward, CA 94544 USA
(This humorous piece was posted on the web by Ahmad Radmanesh):
The tribal wisdom of the Dakota Indians, passed on from one generation to the next, says that when you discover you are riding a dead horse, the best strategy is to dismount.
However, in modern business, because of the heavy investment factors to be taken into consideration, often other strategies have to be tried with dead horses, including the following:
1. Buying a stronger whip.
2. Changing riders.
3. Threatening the horse with termination.
4. Appointing a committee to study the horse.
5. Arranging to visit other sites to see how they ride dead horses.
6. Lowering the standards so that dead horses can be included.
7. Appointing an intervention team to re-examine the dead horse.
8. Creating a training session to increase the rider's load share.
9. Re-classifying the dead horse as living-impaired.
10. Change the form so that it reads: "This horse is not dead."
11. Hire outside contractors to ride the dead horse.
12. Harness several dead horses together for increased speed.
13. Donate the dead horse to a recognized charity, thereby deducting its full original cost.
14. Providing additional funding to increase the horse's performance.
15. Do a time management study to see if the lighter riders would improve productivity.
16. Purchase an after-market product to make dead horses run faster.
17. Declare that a dead horse has lower overhead and therefore performs better.
18. Form a quality focus group to find profitable uses for dead horses.
19. Rewrite the expected performance requirements for horses.
20. Promote the dead horse to a supervisory position.
21. Apply for a government subsidy to retain dead horses.
Professor Kassim Hashemi has sent us an expose on an Afghan solution. Because of lack of space, we can dispense with the historical overview. The actual plan is as follows:
Unlike an expected bloody new year, there seem to be peace efforts underway from Washington to Islamabad. Whatever their thoughts, the peace makers must realize that a broad-based government (unlike previous ethnic monopolies) is the only solution. In my opinion, a council of 22 people, roughly (8 Tajiks, 6 Pushtuns, 3 Uzbeks, 3 Hazaras, 1 Nooristani and 1 Baluch) can represent our ailing nation. For this initial stage, the belligerent leaders and qualified individuals outside the country can nominate themselves. The council later on can be better screened, but at this fragile moment the Afghans are unprepared for any realistic election. The council chooses one member as the chairman who is to be the head of the state, and he nominates another member (not of his own ethnic group) as prime minister who will in turn form his cabinet representing all six groups. Such a council is the only accord that can bring about peace along with national satisfaction and unity.
We have received the publication published in Persian:
Mosaafer published in Dari Persian
(Editor: Anwar Rawi) in Australia.
Annual Subscription to Mosaafer for countries other than Australia is $60.00 Australian.
Their latest issue, April 3, 1998, has a detailed interview with Commander Ahmad Shah Masud.
Mosaafer
P.O. Box 71
Macquarie Fields, N.S.W
2564 Australia
RAWA (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan) in its peaceful procession to observe "black day," occupation of Kabul by the Taliban, was confronted with violence by the supporters of the Taliban.
The Muslim , April 30, 1998 (Lahore) reported that the behavior by the supporters of the Taliban "provoked strong protest in women's organizations …who condemned the Kabul government for its discriminatory measures against women…in Afghanistan." Begum Tahira Mazhar Ali, General Secretary, Democratic Women's Association, was quoted as saying, "Taliban regime was misusing the sacred name of Islam" …imposing "fascist measures against women barring them from education and employment opportunities, subjecting them to worst type of discrimination." She said, "so-called Islamist regime resorting to savage measures forced women and poor population of the country to die in hunger and destitution." Referring to the attitude of power engaged in "peace talks", Tahira Mazhar Ali said it was regrettable to note that none of the powers that matter in Afghan affairs cared to force Taliban to stop their savagery. They were rather interested only in having a free and safe passage to Central Asian Republics to benefit from their rich resources.