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Afghanistan Outlook

UNITED NATIONS -- The United Nations Office of the Co-ordinator for Afghanistan, UNSMA and the World Bank

Food Security in Afghanistan: 1999 to 2000

By Paul Clarke

The idea of '"food security"

Food security is easier to describe than it is to measure. The generally accepted definition of 'food security' is access by all people, at all times, to enough food of sufficient quality to ensure a healthy, active life. This definition is acceptable largely because it is comprehensive, and it is comprehensive because it is made up of a mixture of several ideas. Within the definition there are references to food quantity, food quality, health status, differential access to food as a result of poverty, age or gender, food production and seasonality--all these ingredients have been thrown into this one pot. To understand the whole idea of food security we need first to separate the different ingredients. We can begin this process by differentiating between two basic criteria: availability of food and access to food.

The idea of food availability is simple: in order for everyone in an area to be food secure, there has to be enough food available for them to eat, either through local food production or through efficient import mechanisms. The measurement of food security must begin with an assessment of the availability of food; is there enough for everyone to eat? This sort of analysis--the analysis of availability--tends to be carried out on a geographical basis, looking at the whole country, or regions within the country.

However, the fact that there is sufficient food for everyone in the market or the fields is not, in itself, enough to guarantee that a population is food secure. Elements of the local population might be too poor to afford food, or lack the resources to grow food, even in areas that have food surpluses. So, in addition to looking at availability of food, we have to consider the ability of all the individuals within the population to get this food. This ability to get food can be referred to (in shorthand) as 'access' to food. (1)

The question of access occurs in several ways, as several factors contribute to the ability of an individual to get food. The first of these factors is the economic strength of the household to which the individual belongs: the resources, such as land, labour power, livestock, and social alliances, which the household has at its command. Generally speaking, richer households have more and better quality food, and are better able to cope with emergencies. At this level, food security is about 'livelihoods', and not just about food, as the quantity and quality of food that a household consumes is part of the wider set of economic decisions and activities that the household undertakes. Whereas questions about availability tend to look at production and importation of food by geographic area, these questions are more concerned with differences between different types of households within a geographic area. The axis of analysis changes from geographical to social, from production to consumption, and from a 'food based' to a more rounded 'livelihood' approach. The geographical location of an individual affects the amount of food that is available to them. The economic status of the household within which the individual lives affects the ability of that individual to get food. But even within those households that get enough food for the needs of all their members, there is no guarantee that all members of the household receive enough food to enjoy a healthy and active life. Food may not be shared equitably between different household members. Where this is the result of cultural beliefs about food rather than individual choices, this can be understood by looking into the cultural practices of the area. Again, the locus of our study has shifted, from economics to culture, and from the community (which is divided by household types) to the household, and its divisions by gender and age.

A final factor which might prevent an individual gaining access to sufficient food is the health status of the individual: many illnesses prevent efficient uptake of calories and nutrients from food, and the prevalence of disease needs to be understood in any comprehensive study of food security.

In sum, understanding food security means looking at the relationship between people and food. This relationship is mediated by the amount of food available, the nature and success of the economic activities households undertake to access food, the way food is shared within the household, and the uptake of energy and nutritive elements in the food by the individual. Within the UN system, FAO tends to concentrate on the issue of food availability, WFP on the issue of access, and UNICEF and WHO on the issue of uptake.

Food availability in Afghanistan

A poor harvest in 1999 reverses a general trend of increased Afghan cereal production over the last decade. However, the national harvest figures hide extreme regional variations. To maintain national food security, imports will have to take up the slack. Recent events suggest a danger of imports being less readily available than in 1998. Even if imports are available, certain areas are at high risk of cereal availability problems.

The study of food availability in Afghanistan normally reduces to a study of cereal availability. Cereals dominate the Afghan diet (2) and figures for cereal production and importation are easier to come by than figures for other commodities. For Afghanistan as a whole, the quantity of cereal produced within the country rose throughout the 1970s, largely as a result of improved agricultural technology, fell dramatically through the 1980s,(3) and began to increase again from the early 1990s. This year (1999 to 2000) is the first year since 1995 to show a decrease in total cereal production. (4)

Wheat production in 1977 was recorded at 2.9 million tonnes.(5) By 1992, production had fallen to around 1.6 million tonnes. By 1998, the best year since the conflict in Afghanistan began, production had risen steadily to 2.8 million tonnes, only to fall this year to 2.5 million tonnes.(6) Over the period 1979 to 1999, the population has also increased significantly, although reliable population figures are not available. Consequently, while cereal production levels are moving towards those recorded before the conflict began, the amount of cereal available per person has lagged behind. In 1977, Afghanistan was almost cereal self-sufficient, importing only around 2,500 metric tonnes (MT) of wheat.(7) This year, although wheat production is only a little over 10% below 1977 levels, the FAO/WFP mission estimated cereal import requirement at 1,123,000 MT.

Of course, this year's decrease in the availability of locally produced food will not be spread evenly across Afghanistan. There are several reasons for this. First, the decrease in production is largely a consequence of lower than average rainfall and snowfall over the growing season. While this was a general trend in Afghanistan, there seem to have been differences in the level of drought from one area to another, and in some areas, there may not have been any significant reduction in rainfall at all.(8) Secondly, even in areas that have been hit by drought, the effects of the drought on cereal production will differ depending on the local system of cultivation. Irrigated cultivation fed by glacier streams did not see great decreases in production, as the water source was unaffected by drought. Rainfed areas (those dependent on precipitation, rather than irrigation, to supply water to the crop) which suffered drought were badly affected. While 1999 cereal production, nationally, was down by 16% compared to 1998,(9) production actually increased in much of Badghis district, a rainfed area that did not suffer particularly badly from drought.(1)0 Production decreased by an average of around 25% in Dai Kundi,(1)1 a highland district largely dependent upon karez irrigation, and by 60% to 70% across most of rainfed Sari Pul province.(12)

Decreased cereal production does not necessarily mean decreased cereal availability. Normally, in an area where production declines, we can expect the commercial sector to make up any shortfall. Under certain unusual conditions, though, the commercial sector fails to make enough food available for the needs of the population of an area. The most brutal cause of this market failure is blockade, where traders are prevented from supplying an area by force. A more complex, but equally devastating failure of the market mechanism can occur when the profit to be had from supplying an area with food becomes too low for traders to think it worth doing. This can happen when an area is a long distance from possible areas of supply, making transport costs unreasonably high. It may also be a result of low population density or extreme poverty in the food deficit area, making the return to investment too low for the trader to consider transporting food. This is especially the case where traders are setting up new lines of supply to areas where they have not previously operated. At the time of writing, the picture concerning cereal imports to Afghanistan in 1999/2000 is unclear. As a cereal deficit country, Afghanistan imports food grains even in good agricultural years. The bulk of this imported cereal comes from, or through, Pakistan. In 1999/2000, Pakistan appears to be relatively food secure in terms of national availability of cereals, and should have no need of curtailing exports. The Government of Pakistan is reported to have around five million MT of cereals in store, and to have set aside 600,000 MT of wheat for purchase by Afghanistan.

However, since mid-October traders in Kabul, Kandahar and Peshawar have reported that it is becoming increasingly difficult to get permits for legal importation of cereal from Pakistan, and that the border is being more rigorously controlled to prevent smuggling. Because of decreased supply, compounded by devaluation of the Afghani, the price of cereal has increased by over 30% in Kabul and Kandahar over the last month. This situation is worryingly similar to the cereal crisis of 1997, when the Pakistani border was closed for several months. The border remained, over this time, relatively porous, but even so, cereal became difficult to find in Kabul, and prices increased by over 100%. If this situation were to repeat itself in 1999, it could have extremely serious consequences for cereal availability in Afghanistan. Increased cereal prices would cause problems of access for the poor in urban areas and those parts of rural Afghanistan that are cereal deficit. (In 1997, the ripple effect of price increases spread to areas that are not normally reliant on imports from Pakistan, as traders from Kabul turned to other markets within Afghanistan.) WFP, the World Bank, and other agencies are following this situation with concern. WFP intends to import 115,000 MT of commodities (mostly wheat) into Afghanistan over the coming year, but this quantity would be dwarfed by the requirement if the border were to be closed successfully for any length of time. We do not know much, now, about alternative sources of cereal supply, although there are reports that the Taleban have imported 60,000 MT of cereals from Kazakhstan. Continued closure of the Iranian border is unlikely to have any large-scale effect on imports, as Iran does not seem to have been a large-scale supplier of cereals.

If the border remains open, cereal availability problems will probably occur in those higher risk areas: regions which are normally cereal deficit and which have been blockaded, regions which have seen substantial decreases in agricultural production and are unable to attract traders, or cereal deficit regions which are closed off by natural disasters.

At the time of writing, the only area suffering from military blockade is the Panjshir valley and northern Shomali plains. Following military offensives in August 1999, the pre-existing restrictions on movement into the area from the south have been tightened. In addition, a large civilian population has been displaced into an area that was already partially dependent upon imports to achieve food sufficiency. Northern supply routes to the valley, via Taloqan, are now threatened with closure by military action, and will, in any event, be closed by snow with the onset of winter in November/December. Because of increased population in the Panjshir valley, and static or decreased levels of trade, there is a real danger that not enough food will be available in the valley for consumption over the winter period. An inter-agency team based in the Panjshir valley is currently monitoring the situation.(13) Other areas of Afghanistan remain vulnerable to blockade: in particular, the population of Faizabad town, who are estimated to receive around 85% of their cereal supply from the irrigated areas of Takhar province.(14) Much of this supply passes along one road, which is close to the front line, and so vulnerable to obstruction. The central highlands of Afghanistan, which suffered from blockade in 1997 and 1998, are also vulnerable to closure of roads by military action or deliberate policy, in the event of renewed conflict breaking out in the area.

Other parts of Afghanistan are vulnerable to failure of cereal import for commercial, rather than military, reasons. In particular, the highland districts of Badakhshan province and the more inaccessible parts of the central highlands (particularly Sharestan, Dai Kundi, and Waras districts)(15) have low population densities and are expensive to access. These areas are always vulnerable to cereal supply failure. If cereal prices rise across the country, it can become uneconomical for all but those traders based in these districts to supply cereal to their markets. Poor harvests in 1999 make this a distinct possibility. In addition, because of the 1998/9 drought, there are concerns about areas which are not chronically vulnerable, but which might become vulnerable to supply failure in 1999/2000. One area of particular concern is the province of Ghor, where initial reports indicated a 75% reduction in rainfed wheat.(16) Subsequent estimates put production (combined rainfed and irrigated) at 50% of 1998 levels. Under normal circumstances, Ghor is almost cereal self-sufficient.(17) This means that marketing links for cereal import are weak, and Ghor province (including Lal and Sarjangal districts) may find it difficult to attract sufficient supplies from outside. The same situation could occur, for similar reasons, in more remote parts of Sari Pul, Faryab, Samangan, and Balkh provinces over the next year.

WFP, FAO and several NGOs are currently collaborating to improve our knowledge of the situation in these at risk areas.

Access to food in Afghanistan

Food insecurity--because of limited ability to buy or grow food--is a chronic problem for many Afghans. Large sections of the urban population--the urban poor--are food insecure, although the level of food insecurity differs markedly from one city to another. Rural poverty, while more difficult to measure, also leads to chronic food insecurity, and again, some areas are more affected than others. In 1999 and 2000, these areas of chronic food insecurity will be worst affected by the effects of poor harvests, but populations who were previously food secure will become food insecure as a result of displacement.

In Afghanistan there are some groups of people who every day find it difficult to get enough food, even though food is available in the markets or fields around them. These people are termed the chronically food insecure.

The highest concentrations of chronically food insecure people live in urban environments. There are several reasons for this: as urban environments have higher population density, it makes sense that they should have higher numbers of all types of households, but this does not fully explain why there are so many food insecure persons in Kabul, Faizabad and Mazar-e-Sharif. In these three cities, and particularly in Kabul, not only is the total number of food insecure persons high, but the proportion of the population who are food insecure is also higher than it would be in most rural areas. Two recent surveys have suggested that the chronically food insecure form over 10% of the population of Kabul,(18) as opposed to less than 5% in the poor rural areas of central Ghor(19) or Bamiyan.(20) There is, of course, a tendency for displaced persons and other groups who have lost assets and capital (including human capital) to move to urban environments, and this movement is greatly accelerated in time of war. So, cities contain a higher proportion of poor people. At the same time, these urban poor tend to receive less charity than do poor households in a village. This may be because of competition for charity between the large numbers of poor and destitute persons in the cities, or simply because of the anomie of city life.(21) A further explanation for the high levels of food insecurity in urban areas is that restrictions on women taking part in economic activities are more strictly enforced in urban environments than in rural ones, and so households dependent upon female labour find it harder to survive in the city.(22)

In an urban environment, chronic food insecurity is almost invariably the result of income poverty, and to a lesser extent, of weak social links. People get almost all of their food through the market. If a household doesn't have enough money to enter the market, or wealthy friends and relatives prepared to assist them, they will find it difficult to get enough food and particularly difficult to get the more nutritious (and generally expensive) items.

This makes the analysis of food insecurity (from the point of view of access to food) relatively simple in the cities of Afghanistan. The food insecure are those with the lowest incomes. The lowest incomes, in most cities in Afghanistan, are those earned by women and children performing paid work.(23) Where households are reliant upon the work of women and children for their income, they tend to be very poor indeed.(24)

Better-paid, but still low-income work for men tends to be as unskilled casual labourers or low and middle level government servants. Within these low-income categories, the poorest will be those with the highest dependency ratio: the households with the fewest people working relative to the number of mouths to feed. Where WFP has studied the income generating activities of IDPs in urban settings, they have found that the activities and income levels of IDPs (after a period of transition) are very similar to those of residents with households of the same demographic composition. WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) unit is attempting to measure and compare food insecurity from one city to another, from one economic group to another, and from city to country. The VAM unit is doing this by calculating the total income (including the income that comes as own-produced food, or as gifts) of households in different economic groups and different geographical areas. These incomes are then compared to a common expenditure basket. The items in the expenditure basket are the same in all locations, although the prices of these items, and so of the whole basket, change over time, and from one place to another.(25) In Jalalabad, the basket cost around US $ 7.60 per person per month in 1998. In Faizabad, over the same period, it cost US $ 8.00 per person per month, and in the northern rainfed areas, US $ 6.60. These are the minimum incomes per person per month required in each area. At the same time, incomes differed from one place to another: average monthly income, per person, for a labouring family would be US $ 7.30 in Jalalabad, US $ 6.40 in Faizabad, and US $ 4.50 in the northern rainfed areas.(26)

Using these figures, we can compare levels of poverty (and so food insecurity, for in the urban environment they amount to almost the same thing) from one urban area to another.

For the poorest group -- those households without an able bodied man -- the situation appears to be worst in Kabul: on average, households in this category earned around 30% of the minimum income figure.(27) In Mazar and Faizabad, households in the same category earned around 40% of minimum income. Slightly better off were the poorest in Jalalabad and Kandahar: in Jalalabad, households in this category earned 70% of minimum income; in Kandahar, they earned 75%.

For the larger vulnerable group households with one male worker the relative poverty in the different cities was similar. Income poverty, and so food insecurity, was worst in Kabul, Faizabad, and Mazar: in all three cities, households with one able bodied casual labourer were earning around 70% of minimum income.(28) In Jalalabad, households of the same type earned over 80% of minimum income needs, and in Kandahar, 118%.

Failure to meet minimum income needs does not mean that these households were starving. In all the cities surveyed, the labouring poor group could meet their minimum energy needs by spending the vast bulk of what they earned just on buying cereal, and buying very little else. Failure to meet minimum income thresholds means that poor households have to make choices about how they spend their scant resources: between filling (but non-nutritious) foodstuffs and expensive vegetables, milk, meat or pulses, or between food and medicine. It means that poor households live in fear of the wage earner falling sick, and are often forced to beg or take part in other activities that are dangerous or 'shameful'. The urban poor, and especially the poor of Kabul, Faizabad and Mazar, cannot be sure of where their next meal is coming from, which is surely as good a definition of food insecurity as any. The poorest households in these cities were reliant on begging and international assistance to survive.

The information above relates to 1998, the baseline year for the VAM urban surveys. The situation has not improved, however, in 1999, and there are no signs of improvement for 2000. Since April 1998, WFP in Afghanistan has made a monthly record of the terms of trade between casual labour and wheat flour, as the food security of the poor (although not, as we have seen, of the very poorest) is dependent upon working to buy wheat flour. Over the entire period, Kabul has consistently recorded the worst terms of trade, and the situation has deteriorated in 1999: in August 1998, one day's labour would buy 5.6 kg of flour. In August 1999, the same labour would buy only 4.5 kg.

Action contre le Faim (ACF) nutritional surveys show a slight but steady decline in the nutritional status of the under-five population of Kabul from November 1995 to February 1999,(29) and this decline seems to correlate with a general trend of decreased purchasing power and increased difficulties of accessing food in the city. In Faizabad and Mazar, terms of trade are also worse in late 1999 than they were in 1998: in August 1999, a day's casual labour bought 30% less flour in both cities than it had one year previously.(30)

As these urban centres decline, external investment and central revenue decreases, infrastructure deteriorates and population increases, wages and purchasing power seem set to continue to fall. Urban food insecurity is largely a consequence of urban poverty, and so food security cannot be assured without investment in economic change. Until this becomes practicable, WFP expects to address the consequences of poverty (as they relate to food) through subsidised bakeries in Kabul and Mazar and through periodic food distributions.

Chronic food insecurity is less easily identified and defined in rural areas of Afghanistan than in urban areas. This is partly because rural populations have so many more options for obtaining food than their urban compatriots: they can buy food, but they can also grow food, slaughter it, gather it or hunt it. In the countryside, we cannot simply say that high prices, combined with low cash incomes, will lead to food insecurity: the market is almost irrelevant to the food security of many cereal farmers, while to Kuchi pastoralists, the price of livestock is more important than the price of wheat. However, we can crudely say that areas that have low agricultural productivity, low levels of livestock ownership, high cereal prices and low levels of cash income will tend to be chronically food insecure. Places where access to food is likely to be difficult for a sizeable proportion of the population are often the same areas where supply of cereals is also vulnerable to disruption: highlands with poor access, low population density, little pasture, and low crop yields. So as with cereal availability, the areas which are always of concern are the central highlands (particularly the southern part of Bamiyan province and northern Uruzgan province), Badakhshan (particularly highland Badakhshan) and possibly parts of Nuristan province. In addition, the rainfed plains north of the Hindu Kush chain, stretching from Baghlan to Faryab provinces, the rainfed highlands of Ghor, Kandahar and Zabul provinces, and some pastoralist groups may be chronically food insecure.

Much more work is required to quantify levels of food insecurity in these areas. Recently, the WFP VAM team has begun work on total income in some of these areas, and the picture is not encouraging. In 1998, the "poor" group (landless labourers or small landowners, depending upon area) was earning only 65% of total income needs in Badakhshan; this means that they were poorer than urban casual labourers in Kabul. In rainfed areas of Faryab, this group was earning around 70% of income needs, in Ghor, 85% of income needs, and in Badghis a little over 100% of income needs. Unfortunately, the VAM unit does not have figures available for the central highlands, which were surveyed before this method of analysis was introduced.

In most of these chronically food insecure areas, the 1998/9 drought will increase food insecurity, either directly, through reduction of yields, or indirectly, through increased cereal prices. WFP is currently collaborating with several UN agencies and NGOs to determine how bad food insecurity in these areas will be over the coming year. SpecificallyWFP needs to know whether there will be sections of the population who are unable to meet their minimum food energy requirement. Under these circumstances, a household is not only unable to meet minimum income (as defined by the expenditure basket) but cannot achieve even their minimum energy needs through buying only cheap cereals. Already, the information collected points to a need for emergency intervention to mitigate the effects of drought (in some cases, compounded by last year's blockade) in parts of Sharestan, Dai Kundi, Lal and Sarjangal, and Ghor.(31) WFP and partners are also analysing the need for drought-related intervention in Panjao and Waras (Bamiyan province), Beshud (Wardak province), Badakhshan province, and the rainfed areas of Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces.

Preliminary results suggest that no life-saving intervention is required in Kandahar and Zabul.

In addition, there are areas which were previously relatively food secure, which in 1999 have become food insecure as a result of conflict or population movement. These include the Panjshir valley in Kapisa province and the districts of Bamiyan, Saighan and Shibar in Bamiyan province. In both areas, the problem is not solely one of food availability; even if sufficient food reaches these areas, there are large sections of the population who, because of displacement and loss of assets and livelihoods, will not be able to afford it. At the time of writing, WFP has begun emergency operations in these areas, and remains concerned about the future food security of the Shomali plains (Kabul, Parwan and Kapisa provinces). As the conflict in Afghanistan continues into 2000, WFP will have to remain prepared to respond to acute food insecurity caused by war and population displacement.

Because access to food involves a more complex set of activities in rural than in urban areas, it is also more difficult to point out what sort of people within an area are likely to be food insecure. Chronic food insecurity at household level is usually a consequence of poverty, it is true. But poverty in the countryside is about more than just low cash incomes: it is a compound of lack of rights to land, animals, traction, labour and off-farm income generating activities. In each area, poverty takes on a subtly different shape. For example, in parts of Ghor district, poverty seems to be less a result of landlessness (which is very uncommon) than a result of low livestock holdings: the scarce commodity in this area is animal traction. In the central highlands, poverty is again not simply a consequence of landlessness, but of landlessness compounded by a lack of social connections.(32) WFP has found it instructive to attempt to understand poverty and chronic food insecurity better and to work with communities and operating partners in their targeting of the food insecure. This difficulty in defining what sort of households are food insecure in emergencies is even greater than in long-term, chronic situations. In emergencies, it is not only the poor who are affected: if a prosperous and a poor household are suddenly displaced, and do not have time to take anything with them, they are liable to be equally food insecure. Under certain circumstances, the poor may actually fare better than the better off in an emergency. Acute food insecurity can strike in seemingly capricious ways, and to understand the effects of an emergency on access to food, we need to understand how food was obtained by different sorts of household before the emergency, and how this access has been changed. In conducting emergency food needs assessments, WFP will continue to look not only at the total needs, but also at the type of households who are most in need.(33)

Access to food inside the household

Even rich households can have food insecure members. Just as we need to avoid making assumptions about what sort of households are most food insecure, so it is important not to assume that, just because a household is food secure, all of the members of that household have access to enough food.

This is perhaps particularly important in a culture such as that of Afghanistan, where gender and age are so closely linked to behaviour related to food. It is quite normal in much of Afghanistan for women and children to eat after the men have finished, and in many parts of the country there seem to be taboos as to what sort of food young children should eat.

At present, there is no conclusive evidence to link this type of behaviour to higher levels of food insecurity among certain age groups or among women. Nutritional surveys in Kabul of the under-five age group, where disaggregated by gender, have not presented a consistent picture. In some surveys, female children have higher levels of malnutrition than male children do,(34) but in others the position is reversed.(35) A relatively recent nutritional survey of parts of the central highlands found higher levels of acute malnutrition among boys than among girls.(36)

If our understanding of food insecurity in Afghanistan is to be at all comprehensive, we need to pin down the facts of intra-household distribution. WFP is currently preparing terms of reference for a consultant to investigate these issues.

Conclusion

Food security in Afghanistan is multi-faceted. Food security, in terms of the availability of food for eating and the ability of households to access this food, is a part of the economy. Food security, in terms of the ability of people within households to get a "fair share" of this food, is part of culture. Afghanistan in 1999 is still not economically integrated, but rather is composed of a series of linked economies, some of which cross state boundaries into Pakistan or Iran. Afghanistan is not now, nor has it ever been, culturally homogenous. Under these circumstances, it is much more effective to think about food security on a local, rather than a national, scale.

At the same time, we can make some broad generalisations. The majority of chronically food insecure people in Afghanistan live in one of two extremes: cities (and particularly Kabul, Faizabad and Mazar-e-Sharif) or low population density, remote and relatively unproductive highland areas. In the cities, the food insecure are those with the lowest cash incomes relative to commodity prices. For these populations, 1999 seems likely to see increased food insecurity, as competition for employment grows, food prices rise and incomes fall in real terms. In many (but not all) of the isolated rural areas in the centre and north of the country, decreased crop production in the 1999 harvest will also lead to increased levels of impoverishment and debt, which in turn builds up chronic food insecurity in the future.

While it is still too early to say with confidence, the 1998/9 drought, if taken alone, seems unlikely to lead to acute food insecurity over most of the areas affected. In most places, farmers and sharecroppers will sell assets, take out loans, send family members to work in the more prosperous cities or neighbouring countries, and rely on patronage to survive this lean year. People will get poorer, and hope for a bumper harvests next year to recoup their losses. Only in areas where assets are exhausted and patronage links stretched to their utmost might people find themselves unable to survive. These include the central highlands, blockaded from May 1997 until September of last year; Badakhshan, where extremely poor people are reliant upon grain that passes along one vulnerable road; the Panjshir valley, also blockaded, and now sheltering a large number of almost destitute displaced families; and central Ghor, where poor harvest, high cereal prices and decreased livestock prices have simultaneously increased the income requirement of poor households and decreased their income-earning capacity.

The spectre of border closure, and subsequent decreased availability and increased cereal prices, is more worrying. Were prices to rise as they did in 1997, over one-third of the population of Kabul, Mazar and Faizabad would find it difficult or impossible to meet their minimum food needs without increased levels of assistance from the international community.

The problem would also affect other urban centres, such as Kandahar and Ghazni, where the population is currently relatively food secure. Prices would also rise in the countryside, particularly in rural cereal deficit areas, and this would seriously compound the food insecurity of the areas mentioned above, and possibly make certain other areas food insecure. This situation will require careful monitoring in the weeks and months to come.

The United Nations and the international assistance community has begun supplying food to some of these areas, and is assessing needs in others. This emergency assistance should save lives, but it cannot guarantee food security. What is needed to assure food security in Afghanistan is a commitment, not least by the leaders of the Afghan people, to infrastructure development, to agricultural support and support to marketing, and to urban employment creation (and specifically employment creation for women). Much of this could be achieved now. Even more could be achieved given peace.

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1 The whole issue of access to food, as opposed to availability of food, as the basis of food security, was opened by Amartya Sen in the seminal 'Poverty and famines' (1983).

2 In all thirteen food security baseline surveys conducted by the WFP VAM unit to date, cereals, predominantly wheat, have formed 75% or more of total energy intake for all socio-economic groups surveyed. Other sources of energy found in most places include vegetable oil, milk and milk products, meat, fruit and nuts and pulses.

3 A 50% decrease in agricultural production between 1978 and 1987 is recorded in the 'Agricultural survey of Afghanistan, 1st report,' SCA 1988.

4 FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission to Afghanistan, Special Report, ÎFAO/WFP June 1999.

5 In 'Afghanistan, the journey to economic development, Vol. II,' World Bank 1978.

6 ÎFAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission to Afghanistan, Special Report, ÎFAO/WFP June 1999.

7 Ministry of Planning, Govt. of Afghanistan, 1978. Note that this figure is for official imports only, but unofficial imports are unlikely to have been very much higher.

8 For a broader discussion of the 1998 drought, rainfall patterns in Afghanistan, and the difficulties of measuring precipitation in Afghanistan, see: 'Rainfall trends in Afghanistan, 1958 to 1998, 'WFP/VAM (Afghanistan).

9 'FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission to Afghanistan, Special Report, âFAO/WFP June 1999.

10 Personal communication from WFP VAM survey team to Badghis, August 1999.

11 'Dai Kundi yield survey, ÎACF, August 1999.

12 Debriefing report of WFP VAM survey team to northern rainfed areas, August 1999.

13 See 'Food needs in the Panjshir Valley: report on debriefing of Panjshir food needs assessment team,Î WFP/VAM (Afghanistan), September 1999. See also 'Panjshir valley/Shomali IDP assessment mission report,ÎUNDP/UNOCHA, September 1999. The situation is currently evolving, and further reports are expected.

14 Food security baseline report, Faizabad, WFP VAM (Afghanistan) 1999.

15 There is a wealth of recent reports and surveys on problems of access and availability of food in these districts. Issues of the marketing and availability of food are considered in, 'Discussion of possible interventions in the Hazarajat, Î WFP VAM (Afghanistan) September 1998, 'Recommendations for Assistance to the Hazarajat,Î WFP VAM Afghanistan October 1998 and updates; 'Update on the situation in Sharesta,' ACF June 1999; 'Update on the situation in Dai Kundi, 'ACF August 1999, 'Food security case study Shirdosh /Sareqol, ÎRCO Central Highlands, 'UNOCHA June 1999. However, as this last report notes, we are still a long way from understanding how the cereal trade functions in these areas.

16 'FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission to Afghanistan, 'Special Report, ÎFAO/ WFP June 1999.

17 'Report on WFP's assessment mission to Ghor province, ÎWFP 1997; 'Food security baseline report, Ghor central area, ÎWFP/VAM (Afghanistan).

18 ÎFood security baseline report, Kabul, ÎWFP VAM (Afghanistan) 1999, which used PRA techniques, and ACF 1999, which used a sampled questionnaire survey.

19 ÎFood security baseline report, Central Ghor, ÎWFP/VAM (Afghanistan) 1999.

20 ÎStrategies for support of sustainable rural livelihoods for the Central Highlands of Afghanistan, ÎPattan Development Organisation, 1998.

21 In Mazar, the most food insecure households receive around 30% of their minimum food needs from the charity of others. In rural areas, of Sari Pul, 100 kilometres away, the most food insecure receive up to 70% of their minimum food needs from their neighbours.

22 Although the ability of women to work differs largely from area to area, recent VAM surveys in Ghor and Badghis provinces have both recorded many instances of women owning and working land. This seems to be less prevalent in other areas.

23 For urban women, examples of paid labour include: processing agricultural produce, performing domestic tasks, baking, needlework and tailoring and handicraft manufacture.

24 Many of these households are 'female headed! It is important to remember, however, that many of them are not female headed; but rather are headed by (male) children or disabled adults.

25 The basket contains modest quantities of: wheat flour, rice, pulses, vegetable oil, potatoes, vegetables, meat, salt, matches, soap, clothing and fuel.

26 All figures in this and subsequent paragraphs are from the WFP/VAM food security baseline reports, unless otherwise attributed.

27 To allow for a valid comparison, all figures quoted here do not include the income gained from begging or from WFP or other external interventions, but do include other forms of redistribution (from family and mosques, etc.). As the figures given in baseline reports include begging, they are uniformly higher (except in Jalalabad, where begging doesn't occur on as large a scale).

28 Note that the figure for Kabul is lower than in the original baseline report: this is the result of subsequent changes in the expenditure basket, to bring it into line with other parts of Afghanistan.

29 'Nutrition, vaccination coverage and mortality survey, Kabul city,' ACF, February 1999.

30 âKey price indicators for Afghanistan, August 1999, WFP Afghanistan, September 1999.

31 See: 'Food security in Dai Kundi,' WFP/VAM September 1999, 'Dai Khundi quick assessment, ÎACF August 1999, 'Dai Kundi mission report, ÎOxfam, August 1999, 'Food security baseline, Shahrestan, Î WFP/ VAM June 1998, 'Monitoring report Shahrestan, 'WFP/VAM July 1998, 'Shahrestan quick assessment, 'ACF August 1999, 'Emergency Assessment, Lal and Sarjangal, ÎWFP/VAM September 1999.

32 'Strategies for support of sustainable rural livelihoods for the Central Highlands of Afghanistan, ÎPattan Development Organisation, 1998.

33 See: 'Emergency food needs assessment guidelines for Afghanistan,' WFP/VAM, May 1999.

34 For example the KEP survey of Kabul in 'Afghanistan health profile,' ACBAR 1997.

35 CIET MICS, 1997.

36 ACF, 1998.

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